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Summary of thesis 
 
Privacy is becoming increasingly important due to the advent of e-commerce, 
but is equally important in other application domains. Domain applications 
frequently require customers to divulge many personal details about 
themselves that must be protected carefully in accordance with privacy 
principles and regulations. Here, we define a privacy ontology to support the 
provision of privacy and help derive the level of privacy associated with 
transactions and applications. The privacy ontology provides a framework for 
developers and service providers to guide and benchmark their applications and 
systems with regards to the concepts of privacy and the levels and dimensions 
experienced. Furthermore, it supports users or data subjects with the ability to 
describe their own privacy requirements and measure them when dealing with 
other parties that process personal information. The ontology developed 
captures the knowledge of the domain of privacy and its quality aspects, 
dimensions and assessment criteria. It is composed of a core ontology, which 
we call generic privacy ontology and application domain specific extensions, 
which commit to some of application domain concepts, properties and 
relationships as well as all of the generic privacy ontology ones. This allows for 
an evaluation of privacy dimensions in different application domains and we 
present case studies for two different application domains, namely a restricted 
B2C e-commerce scenario as well as a restricted hospital scenario from the 
medical domain. 
 
13 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Broad overview of privacy 
 
Over the last decade, privacy has attracted more and more attention, both 
in the real and digital world, due to a high number of incidents relating to 
this issue. It is not uncommon to hear about privacy breaches on a weekly 
basis and they are not limited just to the academic area. Usually, the 
incidents reported attract high media attention and we believe that the 
number of unreported or unknown cases are much greater - by far. This 
leads one to ask, why we have some many breaches and how they could 
have occurred in the first place. The problem is fairly widespread and open 
and it is necessary to look at the fundamentals of the concept of privacy 
first. Commonly, we understand privacy as being the protection of "our" 
personal information from any kind of "misuse", that is from use in any way 
we did not intend it to be used. In the old days and before the invention of 
computers, privacy was not regarded as such a big issue as it was 
comparatively easy to keep track of personal details provided to other 
parties. For instance, if one were to buy groceries from a local shop, one 
would simply go there, pay for it and the transaction would be complete. 
The shopkeeper might remember ones face and the transaction for a while, 
but eventually would forget it and continues with his or her business. 
Nowadays, everything is recorded and once entered into a digital system, it 
remains there for an undetermined timeframe in many cases - regardless 
of one's knowledge of this, or wishes. In the case of shopping, one could try 
to go to a different shop every time to avoid being tracked, but this is 
neither convenient nor practical as there will not be enough shops to 
enable one to continue to do so. Nowadays, it is also common to pay 
cashless and shopping at different stores becomes pointless as some or all 
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transactions may be stored in a central location. This is especially true 
when signing up for shopping rewards and loyalty schemes as offered by 
many stores. By signing up for one of these programs, a perfect profile of 
shopping habits can be aggregated. Providers of such programs usually 
"assure" that it is used for marketing purposes only and that it will not be 
misused, but they usually fail to specify these terms in detail. Furthermore, 
one usually has no clue about the amount of information collected and 
stored, or its retention period, partners with whom the data is shared and 
so on. In most cases, it is also impossible to check the information or have 
it deleted - this may, however, vary according to local laws and regulations. 
This brings us to another important aspect of privacy: laws and regulations. 
They play an important role in mandating our personal information and 
providing some power to the subject of the information to control it. 
However, this will need to be examined more thoroughly at a later stage, 
especially in post 9/11 times when governments around the globe 
introduced new legislation to allow intrusion into privacy under the cover 
of counter-terrorism measures. 
 
1.2. Examples 
 
The causes of breaches of privacy are numerous and occur on different 
levels. For example, they may be as simple as forgetting to lock the door to 
a filing cabinet, thereby allowing someone to take a look, or simply 
eavesdropping on someone else's conversation. We can classify these 
causes in broader categories and we will show some examples of what can 
go wrong. Similar to the Identity Theft Resource Center, we use four to five 
broad categories that contain causes for privacy breaches [1]. The first one 
refers to loss or accidental exposure of personal information and is very 
common as people become aware of it quickly. In some countries, 
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companies are required to reveal any loss or theft of information publicly, 
which is the main source. The second case is insider theft. In that case, data 
is used differently from its consented purpose by authorized people. The 
third category is well known and publicized under the term "hacking", 
which refers to any activity of obtaining data without authorization, for 
example stealing or computer attacks. The fourth case is data sharing and 
or aggregation without consent or without necessary sanitizing actions 
performed on the data, which includes anonymization. The fifth category 
which may be seen as an umbrella, or to some extent a category that 
shares some of the properties of the previous ones, is called "system 
failure". We have experienced an example of system failure recently. The 
Department of Planning and Infrastructure (DPI) of Western Australia has 
some management rules in place that determine how staff working for the 
department can access, use and share their collected data. However, the 
guidelines provided to staff members are not entirely clear and therefore 
open to interpretation by the individual, which caused a worker to share 
information with a third party without being authorized, even though he 
thought he would be, and he was instructed to do so. The demarcations 
between categories are not clear, however, as this instance may also be 
considered as Insider Theft. 
 
In a different incident that occurred between 2002 and 2003, JetBlue 
Airways, a carrier in the United States, gave five million customers' travel 
records to a US department contractor [2]. This may not sound as 
something terribly bad at first glance, but it violates customer privacy on a 
high level and sparked outrage amongst passengers and press. Essentially, 
the airline provided Torch Concepts, a contractor for the Department of 
Defense, with five million records of their passengers' travel, which directly 
violates JetBlue Airways' own privacy policy. Torch Concepts then acquired 
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additional demographic information from a different company, started 
merging both data sets and performed data mining to identify possible 
terrorist suspects. This case became public only due to the "foolishness" of 
Torch Concepts who discussed it publicly [3]. Nevertheless, this example 
shows us that data that is given away for "research purposes", which we 
usually regard as something "good" or something "useful" may actually be 
a violation of privacy. Even if we were to assume that JetBlue Airways 
wanted to assist Torch Concept in good faith with its research and did not 
receive any money or other benefits for the data sets, one may 
acknowledge that this may have been an unintentional and unfortunate 
incident from JetBlue's side that should have been checked properly 
beforehand. However, nobody at JetBlue seemed to have checked or 
adhered to their own privacy policies or notified the customers about the 
incident. However, it is usually the case that a company shares its data in 
return for some sort of benefit even if this is not immediately apparent; 
realistically, we assume that this may have also been the case with Jet Blue. 
Therefore, we classify this case under data sharing without consent or 
sanitization. Eventually, this incident resulted in legal action against the 
airline and a class action lawsuit. Any firm involved in privacy violations can 
experience a severe financial impact due to the costs associated with 
impact determination, notification and recovery as well as loss of market 
value and capitalization.  
 
In E-Commerce, customer concerns about privacy protection are an 
increasing deterrent to the transference from the traditional means of 
commercial interaction to its electronic counterpart. According to [1], the 
number of breaches is still on the rise compared to previous years, which is 
frequently caused by e-commerce businesses and related activities. For 
example, in order to complete an online transaction, customers have to 
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submit their personal information such as name and address as well as 
their financial details, such as credit card numbers or bank account 
numbers. These details are then stored with the online business in a more 
or less secure manner. Different types of hacking activities account for the 
overall number of privacy breaches and identity theft. They can include 
weak passwords, weak or non-existent encryption of communication 
channels or storage facilities, phishing activities and so on. On one 
occasion, DSW Shoe Warehouse admitted that more than 1.4 million credit 
card records had been stolen from the company's database by online 
thieves [4] and added that personal information of about 100.000 
customers had been lost as well. A continuously updated report suggest 
that more than 250 million records of personal information have been 
involved in privacy breaches since January 2005 in the United States [5]. In 
a recent case, the University of Alabama notified their student and staff 
that tens of thousands of records containing Social Security numbers had 
been obtained by "hackers" [6].  
 
It is easy to see that none of the categories are crystal clear and completely 
independent of each other, but overlap to some extent. Nevertheless, all of 
the incidents can usually be attributed mainly to one of the categories, 
even though not necessarily exclusively. For instance, one might see 
successful hacking as being purely the hacker's fault, while others might 
see it as fault of the hacked company which might not have implemented 
better safeguards.  
 
From the examples described above, we conclude that privacy goes beyond 
being just a matter of security, and they should not be confused with each 
other. We regard security as a tool to support privacy only, and should not 
try to achieve privacy protection through security mechanisms alone. Many 
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other aspects play an important role, such as policies, management and 
implementations as well as legislation and regulatory frameworks. It is 
necessary to derive knowledge from all the different aspects and areas 
together in order to achieve a better understanding of privacy in general as 
well as in the context of a certain system or particular situation, especially 
with regard to its protection.  
 
1.3. Motivation 
 
As we have seen in the previous section, privacy is a vital component of 
every individual's life, but privacy breaches are more common than ever. 
Naturally, it is in the vital interest of both the individual, about whom 
personal information is stored, as well as that of the receiving and 
processing entity, to protect personal information adequately. The financial 
cost of privacy breaches can be significant for both parties. [7] have 
estimated that a loss of 1000 records of personal information could cost 
$US 166.272 on average. This includes costs for internal investigation, 
notification and crisis management as well as regulatory and compliance 
fees. The cost for the individual is difficult to estimate, as it highly depends 
on the type of information obtained. However, it can be anything from an 
inconvenience to thousands of dollars. The non-financial impact is even 
harder to estimate, but we can safely assume that a bad reputation will not 
be good for business. 
 
1.4. Privacy by Design 
 
When information technology was in its infancy, it was a playground for the 
developers and explorers. New ideas were tested and nobody thought 
about malicious intentions at that stage. Eventually, people became aware 
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that security mechanisms were needed for all the new technologies and 
developers started thinking about how to add them to existing technology. 
We experience the same problem nowadays where new tools and 
applications are developed on a massive scale and people are aware of 
security implications and applications. However, privacy is still not being 
considered as part of the fundamental design of those developments. 
Privacy is regarded as something that can be added later on top of the new 
exciting tools and gadgets. As we learn, we need to understand that 
privacy, just like security, needs to be part of the design as any later 
additions may contain loopholes, and privacy protection is required from 
the ground up.  
 
The term "Privacy by Design" was developed in the 1990s by the current 
Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Mrs. Ann Cavoukian and is still promoted 
today [8] as it has not been addressed properly so far. Amongst others, it 
encompasses the need to recognize that privacy concerns and interest do 
actually need to be addressed from the outset. Furthermore, it requires an 
"early mitigation of privacy concerns when developing information 
technologies and systems across the entire information life-cycle" as well 
as the "adoption and integration of privacy-enhancing technologies" [8]. 
 
1.5. Scope of problem 
 
As described above, privacy breaches can occur due to different 
circumstances and each of them requires different handling methods. 
However, as privacy breaches should be avoided in the first place, it is 
necessary to look at the complete picture and identify how the concepts 
are connected to each other. This includes the different actors and their 
intentions, support and safeguard mechanisms, regulatory background and 
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legislatory issues. Furthermore, it requires one to look at the various 
processes and policies involved. Here it is important to distinguish between 
the individual - whom we will henceforth refer to as the "data subject" - 
about whom personal information is collected, stored, shared and 
processed or used in any other way and the entities using, accessing or 
handling it. Hence, the focus must be on the empowerment of the data 
subjects as it is in their vital interest to keep personal information 
disclosure to a limit. On the other hand, the entities using personal 
information need to be aware of all the implications of their use, not just in 
the interest of the data subject or in line with agreements made with the 
data subject, but also to comply with legislative and regulatory 
requirements.  
 
It is not our intention to invent new privacy enhancing technologies for 
every situation, or create domain dependent mechanisms to enhance and 
protect privacy, as this would change over time with the evolution of 
technologies and shift in paradigms - like the one from traditional WWW to 
Web 2.0. Therefore, we focus this work on the creation of an application 
domain independent conceptualisation of the principles and mechanisms 
of privacy on an abstract level. Thus, the primary focus of this work is the 
derivation and representation of knowledge from the different concepts, 
processes and entities involved in the context of privacy. Naturally, many 
techniques exist to support privacy, including safeguards like encryption, 
policies and agreements, and legal requirements. Due to the vast number 
of elements involved, we will not provide a semantic integration of 
legislative or regulatory frameworks as they vary with different entities. 
Our system can then be used by a variety of different interest groups to 
enhance their understanding of the different concepts and mechanisms 
relating to privacy, and their implications. By using it in the design phase, it 
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can help to integrate privacy concepts into new systems from the ground 
up and helps inexperienced developers in the field. Furthermore, it can be 
used as a benchmarking or even certification tool by a variety of different 
technology providers or users to help them understand how privacy is 
implemented and used in their system or if, and where, flaws may exist. 
 
As it is also not possible to include every single available safeguard 
mechanism or semantic concept from different areas, we limit ourselves to 
the most important and interesting examples that can be transposed to 
other techniques. This paves the way for others to develop specializations 
of these representations for their own purposes. Furthermore, with the 
continuous integration and support of other semantic conceptualizations 
and adoptions, our privacy "system" has the potential to evolve, capturing 
new concepts in more detail. 
 
1.6. Plan of thesis 
 
Following this introduction to the notion of privacy and the scope of this 
thesis, we will present a comprehensive literature review of the privacy 
domain, starting with its historical background. It is then followed by 
elaborations of current issues, challenges and applications, bringing the 
focus on to the web and semantic web respectively. In Chapter 3, we will 
then define the problem, describing the terms and concepts used and our 
choice of methodology in comparison with other methodologies available. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the solution and a roadmap to follow, 
while Chapter 5 describes the generic ontology that has been developed in 
great detail. Chapters 6 and 7 follow with an elaboration of a specialization 
for the domain of health care and e-commerce respectively, which are used 
as case studies to verify our findings. In Chapter 8, we discuss the ontology 
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on an implementational level and show the tools used during that process.. 
This work is concluded in Chapter 9 with a summary of the work, 
suggestions for future improvements and enhancements, and a discussion 
proposing the integration of this work with existing ontologies from other 
domains so that it can evolve and be applied to other areas. 
 
In this chapter, we have introduced the field of privacy in general and 
discussed some examples of privacy breaches and violations. This was 
followed by an elaboration of the motivation for this work and a principal 
discussion of Privacy by Design. The scope of this work was then described, 
and the chapter concluded with a brief plan and outline of the thesis. 
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2. Review and Evaluation of literature 
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of literature relating to the 
area of privacy: firstly from a historical and evolutionary point of view and 
secondly describing the different notions and conceptions. It continues with 
issues of legislation and regulatory requirements, followed by a description of 
general problems, challenges and solutions to privacy issues, and continues our 
focus in digital environments like the web and semantic web. Assurance 
methods and identity management play an important role in privacy 
preservation and are therefore considered. This chapter then concludes with 
background information on ontologies and their relevance. 
 
2.1. Privacy - A Historical View and its Evolution 
 
The concept of privacy is diverse, has many notions and is indeed an 
endogenous conception. It has evolved over time and the first popular 
historical records regarding privacy came from Waren and Brandeis’ “The 
Right To Privacy” which appeared in an 1890 law publication [9]. Privacy 
was defined as “the right to be left alone”, which is a rather simplistic and 
outdated definition given our contemporary understanding of privacy. 
However, it shows that the concept of privacy was introduced under a legal 
constitution and hence requirement. It took almost 80 years for the 
concept to be revisited and revised by Alan Westin [10], who re-defined the 
notion of privacy as “the desire of people to choose freely under what 
circumstances and to what extent they will expose themselves, their 
attitudes and their behavior to others”. This already shows how difficult it 
is to give an exact definition of privacy, especially since and understanding 
of privacy and what it entails evolves over time. We will mention a few 
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more recent definitions, which are not exhaustive by any means, but which 
show that privacy truly is understood differently by different people. 
 
As this work's main aim relates to the area of computing, we will focus on 
privacy accordingly.  
 
2.2. Different Notions of Privacy 
 
Privacy can be seen in different ways and from different aspects and for 
each of these different aspects, different techniques for ensuring 
“protection” may be applicable.  
 
The first notion of privacy comes from one of its definitions. As described 
previously, privacy can be defined as "the subjective condition a person 
experiences when two factors are in place. First, he or she must have the 
power to control information about him- or herself. Second, he or she must 
exercise that control consistent with his or her interests and values". If we 
examine traditional computer systems, access control is usually set up by a 
system/database (or whatever) administrator and usually defines which 
entity is allowed to use which resource. In order to enforce this 
mechanism, the system has to identify the entity accessing it, ensuring that 
it is the one it claims to be (authentication) and deciding whether or not 
access to a certain resource will be allowed (authorization). These rules of 
authentication and authorization must be set up, prior to its usage by a 
certain entity which usually controls the systems either partly or in full. The 
way in which such rules are established and enforced are governed by 
certain security mechanisms, such as encryption, password authentication, 
and so on. The entity accessing a system is usually not able to alter the 
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permissions to access the resources, but is limited to the rules set up by 
other entities and enforced by the system.  
 
This first notion of privacy deals with access control but conversely to the 
one just shown. An individual with the desire to protect its privacy should 
be able to exercise this by defining certain rules which control the access to 
that information. Unlike in traditional security systems, the individual 
creates and alters these rules and once submitted to a computer system, it 
(the computer system) has to obey these rules and not vice versa. 
Furthermore, the individual is also able to alter and revoke the permissions 
granted to other entities. Open systems, where entities may not be known 
a priori by the system can also be supported, which is traditionally not the 
case. However, in order to achieve this, other mechanisms like 
authentication, based on certificates or reputation, as well as notions of 
trust and risk have to be incorporated [11].  
 
Although the concept of privacy in terms of access control from a data 
subject perspective is promising, the concept of auditing or access tracking 
is essential and is, moreover, more powerful. Once permission has been 
granted to access personal information, one would like to know who 
actually accesses this information. It is not enough just to grant the 
permission for potential user and user groups, as nobody might actually 
use it except to obtain data about entities accessing it. In this way, it is 
possible to revoke information or notify entities about changes to 
information.  
 
Another definition is from Privacilla: “Privacy is the subjective condition a 
person experiences when two factors are in place; first, he or she must 
have the power to control information about him- or herself; second, he or 
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she must exercise this control consistent with his or her own interests and 
value” [12]. This matches well with the definition of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada, who defines privacy as: “The right to control 
access to one's person and information about one's self. The right to 
privacy means that individuals get to decide what and how much 
information to give up, to whom it is given, and for what uses” [13]. The 
emphasis given by both definitions fits well within our context as they 
emphasize that the user, which we will call the "data subject" throughout 
the document, has to have the ability to control his or her personal 
information in order to control his or her privacy. 
 
2.3. Privacy and Legislation 
 
Legislation and regulatory frameworks provide a great source for notions, 
issues and challenges of privacy in non-private environments. Depending 
on the geographical (and hence political) location where technology is used 
and personal information is collected, different privacy protection laws 
apply. An overview map of all countries in the world which have privacy 
regulations, is shown in [14]. Usually different countries have different and 
multiple regulations regarding to privacy and its related laws such as the 
"The Privacy Act of 1974" [15] from the United States or in Europe the 
"Directive on Data Protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
and personal data and the free movement of such data" or the "European 
Union Directive concerning the processing of personal data and the 
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector" [16]. 
Specific legislation relating to privacy can be found on the government web 
pages of the related countries. The Privacy Act of 1974 deals with privacy of 
information and sets some fair practices for the usage of data, which are 
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"transparency, individual participation, collection and use limitations, 
reasonable security and accountability".  
 
Another examples of privacy legislation is the Emergency System 911 in the 
United States (or 112 in Europe, 000 in Australia). The Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) requires all operators to obtain 
location information not just from landlines but also from mobile phones 
"within 50 to 100 meters accuracy in most cases" [17]. This also leads to 
some issues in the Internet world and Voice over IP (VoIP), as this system is 
designed to be used anywhere in the world with the same phone number. 
The question is, to which actual number will an emergency call be routed 
and what will the responder see as the number of the originator as 
required by the FCC?  
 
Apart from websites, government and companies always use personal 
information about their customers and citizens in order to work with them. 
Internally, the data is usually stored in systems, which should allow access 
to authorized persons only. While this enforcement of access to personal 
data is technically possible [18], it is sometimes regarded as an overhead 
and increases the costs of implementing and maintaining such a system. 
However, a system administrator could still be able to get access to the raw 
data either by accessing the storage system directly if the data is not 
secured or by intercepting data while in insecure transit. Furthermore, the 
original purpose of the data usually does not matter anymore once access 
to personal information has been granted and it could be used in any way. 
Legislation and Regulation are essential for privacy preservation as it is 
impossible and often impractical to protect privacy by technological means. 
For example, as far as we know, no technology can exist that can prevent 
someone who has read a document, from revealing its contents to others. 
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However, the user may have signed a non disclosure statement and is 
therefore required to keep its contents confidential. In case of a breach, 
legislative action can be enforced if in place, which applies to many 
countries around the world. Another example would be the illegal 
distribution of music or movies on the internet. Even though mechanisms 
like Digital Rights Management (DRM) have been created, their success is 
limited. It is the legislator who can follow up on breaches regardless of 
failing technologies. 
 
Hence, legislation plays an important role for privacy as the subject, 
depending on the laws protecting personal information, receives different 
protection levels. For example, personal information could be much more 
strongly protected (by law) in countries within the European Union (EU), 
than in Middle-East (ME) countries. Therefore, the level of privacy the data 
subject receives would be high in the EU and lower in ME countries. Hence, 
the data subject must be informed where and in which country the data 
flows and how personal information is protected before entering any data. 
This allows the subject to determine whether a certain service is worth the 
possible loss of privacy.  
 
2.4. Privacy issues and challenges on the web 
 
As this work is mainly (but not exclusively) concerned with privacy in a 
digital environment, it is necessary to look at the specific issues in that 
context. We therefore take a closer look at current trends and issues of 
privacy in the digital domain. Before the creation of the internet in general 
and the world wide web in particular, digital storage systems existed but 
were not necessarily interconnected. This aided privacy as data could not 
be linked together as easily. With the uptake of the world wide web, 
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privacy became more and more an issue as it became easier from day to 
day to collect, store, distribute and share information. Therefore, privacy 
on the web faces two major problems, described by [19]: firstly, "the 
inherent open, nondeterministic nature of the web"; and secondly, the 
"complex, leakage-prone information flow of many web-based transactions 
that involve transfer of sensitive, personal information". Here, personal 
information is classified in three broad categories: personal data, digital 
behaviour and communication, which includes messages posted to public 
boards, surveys and polls. Sources of privacy violation come from 
unauthorized information transfer, weak security and data magnets [20], 
which are "techniques and tools that any party can use to collect personal 
data". These include online registrations, IP address identification, cookies, 
trojan horses, web beacons as well as federated identifies [21]. Weak 
security is rather common on the internet due to hacking activities or 
simply insecure design, or in many cases, faulty implementations of 
software or protection systems. Hacking activities can include the 
penetration of personal computers of the data subjects or other systems 
where personal information of data subjects is stored (e.g. shopping 
websites). One of the examples is the "loss" of credit card information of 
more than 1.4 million customers from the company "DSW Shoe 
Warehouse", by unknown data thefts [4]. In recent times, these "losses" 
seem to have increased significantly and we can find such incidents on a 
weekly basis; however, many of them are not published for obvious 
reasons. 
 
2.5. Privacy preserving techniques 
 
Various techniques to preserve privacy have been proposed and have 
emerged in recent times. In its initial stages, privacy preservation was the 
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rather simple application of security techniques to implement access 
control mechanisms for personal information. 
 
Solutions to privacy protection in general and on the web in particular are 
based on three broad categories: protective technologies (e.g. safeguards), 
legislative support and social awareness. When the web (or really any other 
new or emerging technology) first began,, none of these was addressed 
properly as they may not have been known or people were unaware of 
them or the risks involved. Safeguarding technologies are usually thrown 
into the game first as they are quickly developed and released. The other 
two take their time and are mostly reactive and not proactive - until 
something happens. Technological solutions to privacy concerns on the 
web are plentiful and have evolved over time. Most of them are based on 
traditional security technologies, like encryption. A taxonomy of 
technology- and regulation-enabled solutions for privacy preservation can 
be found in [19]. A main driver for privacy on the web is the "Platform for 
Privacy Preferences (P3P)" [22] and its related "A P3P Preference Exchange 
Language (APPEL)" [23]. P3P allows websites to define privacy policies for 
information from the users that is used by that website. In turn, the users 
have the ability to decide whether to use the website and transmit their 
information by defining their preferences through APPEL. This process of 
evaluation and comparison can be semi-automated as policies are written 
in standard XML. In most cases, the web browser takes responsibility for 
that action. We consider P3P as a static facility that has a defined number 
of concepts and provides a description of the various implications of using 
them. It does not take into account the processes and multiple and 
consecutive interactions, and also does not refer to the different privacy 
dimensions and their implications for the overall privacy experience. It is 
also not possible to apply privacy preferences from one application domain 
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to a different one as they are described in an application domain-specific 
manner. Furthermore, we have to note that it is not possible to specify 
what 'acceptable' is, but only what NOT acceptable is. This has partly been 
addressed by other projects like "XPref" [24], an XPath-based Preference 
Language for P3P.  
 
In our earlier work, we have described a privacy management system for 
mobile devices in context-aware environments [25]. However, this system 
was limited in itself as well, as it could not be abstracted to other 
application domains and did not specify or classify the dimension of privacy 
precisely.  
 
2.6. Privacy issues and challenges on the semantic web 
 
The semantic web is (still) a vision of a global network where software 
agents can communicate with, process and understand each other and the 
meaning of data. This is achieved by annotating documents and linking 
information together - for example, by means of ontologies. Ontologies are 
"a shared conceptualization of a domain on which all parties agree" [26]. A 
different and more explicit definition comes from Guarino et al [27], who 
see ontology as "a formal shared, explicit, but partial specification of the 
commonly agreed upon intended meaning of a conceptualisation" [28]. If 
software agents facilitate such an ontology, they can exchange information, 
interact with each other and derive information that is not explicitly given. 
For example, a software agent could determine that the passport of its user 
is about to expire, locate the facility for renewal, determine the time 
required and (perhaps in the future) request it automatically or notify the 
user to get it done. It is likely that personal information may need to be 
transmitted, stored or located in these transactions and privacy is of 
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importance. Early attempts to govern access to web pages, which have 
been enhanced with annotational markups have been very simple and did 
not make use of the shared knowledge - hence, it was not considered as 
facilitating an ontology. 
 
In recent times, the research community has acknowledged the need for 
and usefulness of ontologies on the semantic web [28-31], especially to 
build a usable, useful and pragmatic semantic web, not just academic one. 
Ontologies have been built and proven to be quite successful, like Gene 
Ontology (GO) [32], Protein Ontology [33] or Trust Ontology [11] and many 
more - all representing a piece of the real world as understood and used by 
experts in that particular domain. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that 
the concept of privacy may be modeled as an ontology to aide in the 
preservation of personal information. Semantic web concepts and 
techniques have been used in recent times to support security and privacy. 
We reuse some of those concepts in our ontology as they are building 
blocks, in particular the security ontology mentioned below. 
 
2.6.1. Semantic and ontological concepts 
 
 As a first step to support privacy, mechanisms for access control have been 
proposed, which were very similar to the traditional ones and did not make 
proper use of semantic concepts. Denker et al proposed "Access Control 
and Data Integrity for DAML+OIL and DAML-S" [34]. Therefore, the access 
control mechanism itself is based upon an ontology, allowing extensions by 
future implementations. However, the ontology is used in a rather 
simplistic way, as it is not related to the actual semantics of the content. 
Tumer et al. describe a semantic-based privacy framework for web services 
[35]. Basically, it allows users to specify their privacy preferences with 
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different permission levels. However, its concepts and privacy mechanisms 
are tied to the domain (web services) and cannot be used independently. A 
similar but more sophisticated approach has been proposed by Qin et al. 
[36]. They include ontological mechanisms to derive access control on a 
conceptual level. For example, it is possible to determine that a missile is a 
weapon and because access to weapons is denied, access to missiles must 
be denied as well. However it refers to security concepts only and does not 
take other dimensions into account. 
 
Raskin et al. were among the first to introduce the concept of ontologies to 
the domain of information security and their proposal included: 1) natural 
language data sources as an integral part of overall data sources in 
information security applications; and, 2) formal specification of the 
information security community know-how for the support of routine and 
time-efficient measures to prevent and counteract computer attacks. It 
includes a comprehensive list of words and phrases which were related to 
the domain of information security at that time. All of these concepts are 
modeled item by item within the ontology.  
 
Based upon Tropos [37], a Requirements Driven Development 
Methodology, Mouratidis et al. extend the approach in order to 
incorporate security into the model [38]. Tropos itself is a rather complex 
and complicated approach and requires and overall change in the way 
programmers think as it introduces the concepts of actors, goals, soft goals, 
tasks, resources and social dependencies. They are intended to aide 
programmers to model the real world more efficiently and with less 
proneness to error. However, due to the major changes involved in 
programmers' thinking, it may not be sensible to adopt it as such, even to 
incorporate and evaluate security in application design and programming. 
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Many of the previous approaches have in common that, although they try 
to preserve privacy, they mostly use security safeguards as their only 
approach which may be considered as security protection and not privacy 
preservation approaches. Schumacher, on the other hand, created the first 
proper security ontology. It is an extensible core security ontology that 
incorporates the concepts of asset, stakeholder, security objective, threat, 
attacker, vulnerability, countermeasure and risk [39]. The ontology is based 
on security (design) patterns, which are concepts to help improve the 
understanding of security. According to their specification, a "security 
pattern describes a particular recurring security problem that arises in a 
specific security context and presents a well-proven generic scheme for a 
security solution". These patterns are closely related to Object Oriented 
(OO) design patterns, which are used in software engineering [40]. The 
ontology is abstract and not specific to any particular language and 
prevents inconsistencies in the terminology. This security ontology can be 
easily reused by other ontologies, for example by a privacy ontology, which 
can use it to provide and evaluate safeguards for the protection of personal 
information on a high level of abstraction.  
 
In their paper "Towards Cross-Domain Security Properties Supported by 
Ontologies" [41], Sure and Haller present an approach for secure and 
trusted collaboration between different businesses. It is mainly based upon 
secure authentication of the counterpart (e.g. the other business) 
facilitating a public key infrastructure. The core concept of this security 
ontology is the X509 certificate standard enriched with different properties 
and rules. By using a semantic layer (the ontology), it is possible to span 
administrative domains and establish trust between them.  
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The authors of "Authorization and Privacy for Semantic Web Services" [42] 
address security of semantic web services in a declarative way. The 
descriptions of semantic web services are in OWL-S and related ontologies 
created in order to annotate them. They include security characteristics 
and mechanisms like encryption and digital signatures and a proposal is 
made to incorporate privacy and authentication policies into these OWL-S 
descriptions. Policies related to aspects of security, privacy and 
authorisations are expressed in the Rei ontology [43], an RDFS-based 
language for policy specification. However, as policies and security are 
some of the dimensions of privacy only, this approach is fairly limited in 
terms of expressiveness and its overall understanding of privacy. 
 
2.7. Privacy preserving techniques in Data Mining 
 
Although we do not intend to propose new techniques for privacy 
preservation in data mining, we will use existing and upcoming techniques 
as safeguards within our ontology. It is therefore interesting to investigate 
this area, among many others, in order to understand the principles 
involved and how they are used to achieve better privacy preservation. 
 
Privacy preservation in data mining is one of the biggest challenges today 
as data mining concepts and algorithms get better over time to try to 
discover "hidden" knowledge in large datasets. Randomization was 
introduced first to add noise to a data set and make it less accurate and 
hence less prone to attacks [44, 45]. One of the earlier of these approaches 
includes a technique called k-Anonymity [46], [47], [48-53], which was 
developed to minimize the impact of (re-)identification through queries on 
public databases. Essentially, it is a method used to alter the granularity of 
a query and output results only in cases of k or more results as it may be 
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possible to infer the actual identities of the results and lose anonymity. The 
l-diversity model was introduced [54] afterwards to deal with some of the 
weaknesses of k-Anonymity, where the lack of diversity in the k-
anonymized dataset leaves it open to strong attacks. Nevertheless, neither 
approach scales very well in the case of high-dimensional databases [48, 
55]. More recent research in the area led to the expression of "Differential 
Privacy", which "intuitively, captures the increased risk to one's privacy 
incurred by participating in a database" [56, 57]. With the assistance of 
these techniques, it is possible to obtain accurate information about a 
database while providing a high level of privacy at the same time as they 
provide "formal and ad omnia privacy guarantees" that are proven 
rigorously. 
 
2.8. Summary 
 
In our literature review, we described the different definitions, 
understandings and notions of privacy. We noted that many seem to 
mistake security for privacy and do not address or classify the various 
dimensions of privacy. It seems that - to date - there is no coherent 
semantic representation of privacy available that could aid in the 
understanding of this endogenous concept. Furthermore, none of the 
technologies discussed can be used to assess or benchmark the level of 
privacy experienced in certain situations or systems as no clear and precise 
criteria are defined that could address this issue. Finally, it seems that is 
not possible to use the various methods and techniques elaborated easily 
across different application domains by extension.  
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3. Problem definition 
 
In this chapter, we present a clear and concise definition of the problem 
addressed in this thesis. Nevertheless, before we can begin the elaboration, we 
define terms and concepts and our use of them. Afterwards, we discuss our 
choice of methodology to address the problem as stated in the problem 
definition. 
 
3.1. Terms and concepts used 
 
As this work is mainly concerned with user perceived privacy, we are bound 
to present our interpretation and usage of this term. Therefore, it is 
important to understand that our focus is on privacy in the private and 
commercial sectors, as privacy in the governmental environment is 
categorically different [12]. 
Furthermore, as the concept of privacy is closely related to the terms Trust, 
Reputation and Security, we also provide their definitions and usage in this 
thesis. 
 
3.1.1. Privacy 
 
Privacy has many different definitions, which have evolved 
subsequently over time. Different definitions like "the right to be left 
alone" [9], "the desire of people to choose freely under what 
circumstances and to what extent they will expose themselves, their 
attitudes and their behaviour to others" [10] or "freedom from 
unauthorized intrusion" [58] show the difficulty in defining the concept 
of privacy. There are several important dimensions to privacy and they 
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include access control, the right data and the right purpose as 
discussed below.  
 
3.1.1.1. The right data  
 
 A further notion of privacy deals with the concept of the right data 
which is usually seen as information being accurate, complete, 
relevant and timely [59]. It is strongly desirable for the subject of that 
information, that it actually is the right data in terms just described. 
Imagine that someone alters personal information in order to gain 
advantage for him- or herself. For example, if two people apply for a 
position and it is possible for one of them (i.e. the boss of the other) to 
alter personal information of the other one in order to get the job, this 
would be regarded as a loss of privacy. Not just because the person 
may have made the change illegally (no permission to access it), but 
also if it was done legally (the person having access to that data), a 
violation of privacy occurs in either way as the purpose would have 
been compromised. The subject of that information should be the only 
one to make those changes, either directly or indirectly with his or her 
consent.  
 
3.1.1.2. The right purpose 
 
Once personal information about oneself has been submitted to a 
system, one has lost direct control, and hence, control of privacy 
becomes both more necessary and difficult at the same time. The 
notion of the right purpose concerns the information and its usage 
[59]. Unlike the previous notion of access control, one might have 
granted someone access to certain personal information. However, 
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one cannot be sure what the other entity does with the data. When 
one submits data, it is usually done for a certain purpose, mostly to 
gain something (e.g. buy a product, obtain information about 
something, etc.), which is then regarded as worth the loss of privacy or 
mandatory to fulfil the purpose (e.g. the postal agency needs a name 
and address to actually deliver the goods). One is usually informed 
(explicitly or implicitly) about the usage of the personal information by 
the other party, or as in real life, it is implicit. However, generally, no 
mechanism exists that could stop the other party (which is authorized 
to access it for the sake of simplicity) from accessing that data and use 
it for purposes other than the one explicitly or implicitly agreed on.  
  
It is easy to understand that all the notions just mentioned are part of 
the big picture of understanding privacy and creating a framework that 
includes those properties. 
 
3.1.1.3. What about Confidentiality? 
 
Confidentiality, which is regarded as a property of security is not the 
same as privacy. Confidentiality deals with the protection of 
information in order to ensure that only authorized people get access 
to what they have been authorized for. Young states that 
"confidentially is typically desired where people do not act in their 
private capacities and wish to protect the interest of somebody in 
which they have some non-private role", which is in contrast to the 
definitions of privacy [60].  
 
3.1.1.4. Definition of Privacy 
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As we require a precise enough definition, the previous ones are not 
sufficient enough for our purposes. It is necessary to emphasize that 
privacy is not about information itself, but about a data subject's 
power to control and release personal information. Hence, in this 
thesis, we define privacy in the following way:  
 
Definition 
"Privacy is a subjective condition a person, whom we call the data 
subject, experiences. Hence, the data subject must have the power to 
control information about him- or herself and must exercise that 
control consistent with his or her own interests and values". 
  
This definition is similar in conception and conforms to the statements 
made by Privacilla [12] and the Privacy Commissioner of Canada [8]. In 
a commercial environment, it is relatively easy to control the release 
of personal information, as one can decide not to participate at all in a 
certain transaction and therefore withdraw from the whole process 
completely if deemed necessary. This refers to the existence of the 
legal power to control that release and is independent of its 
pleasantness. On the other hand, controlling that information with 
one's own interests and values in mind, is becoming more and more 
difficult due to the inherent nature of information storage and 
processing in a complex network of business processes. The protection 
of privacy is therefore to be sought mostly in this area. 
 
3.1.2. Trust & Reputation in Privacy 
 
Trust and Reputation are closely-related concepts that play an 
important role when dealing with service providers. Chang et al [11] 
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define trust as "the belief the trusting agent has in the trusted agent's 
willingness and capability to deliver a mutually agreed service in a 
given context and in a given time slot". In our case, we are essentially 
concerned about the context being "privacy preservation". Given this is 
the case, quality aspects have not yet been defined in previous works 
and this thesis aims to address this by providing quality assessment 
criteria. In our context of privacy, this essentially means that a data 
subject who has dealt with a service provider previously is able to 
assess the level of trust he or she is willing to give the service provider 
with regards to the level of privacy preservation in previous dealings. 
On the other hand, if a data subject has not dealt with a particular 
service provider in the past, trust measurements cannot be applied 
and one has to refer to reputation. Agent reputation, which is closely 
related to our need to know the reputation of an entity, has been 
defined by [11] as "an aggregation of the recommendations from all 
the third-party recommendation agents, in response to the trusting 
agent's reputation query about the quality of the trusted agent". We 
are using reputation in the context of privacy and can therefore define 
the dimension of quality from the previous definition as "privacy 
protection". This means that any reputation queries are about the 
trusted agent's privacy protection capability as experienced by third-
party recommendation agents. 
 
3.1.3. Security & Safeguards in Privacy 
 
Security is one of the more important dimensions of privacy 
preservation, but it is important to mention that security is different 
from privacy as described earlier. Security in the context of privacy 
usually refers to the concept of "Safeguard" that is put in place to 
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achieve privacy preservation on different levels. A safeguard is 
therefore defined as any technique that prevents unauthorized entities 
from gaining access to personal information. "Safeguard" however, 
does not refer to methods of preventing access to personal 
information to authorized entities for unauthorized or not consented 
purposes. 
 
Different safeguard categories exist, which we define as "Transit-
Safeguards", "Storage-Safeguards" and "Access-Safeguards". It is 
important to distinguish between the three as it is usually impossible 
to apply a safeguard from one category to a requirement of another 
one. Furthermore, it is also possible to draw conclusions from the 
usage of those safeguards such as the data will be transferred - by any 
means - to a different location or the data will remain in the same 
place. In many cases, it will be necessary to apply both of them, 
independently of each other, to certain scenarios as there is a need to 
collect data (which is transit), store it (non-transit) and access and 
process it (transit). Examples of a storage-safeguard would be 
encryption with a particular encryption technique, but also the 
physical protection of documents by a lockable filing cabinet. On the 
other hand, a transit-safeguard might be as simple as a (physical) 
envelope or using a particular tunnelling technology like Transport 
Layer Security (TLS). Access safeguards provide mechanisms to 
authenticate and authorize individuals to access personal information 
on various levels. 
 
3.1.4. Entity 
 
Definition 
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The term "Entity" is defined as a "physical or digital agent, person, 
company or service provider that falls within a certain jurisdiction".  
 
We are bound to define this term as broadly as possible in order to not 
limit our scope to any particular context and provide the highest level 
of abstraction. It is noteworthy however, to mention that this does not 
apply to governmental institutions as such due to the categorical 
difference between privacy in the private and in the governmental 
sector. In this thesis, "Entity" refers to concepts at the class level, while 
we define instances of this class as "entity-instance". It is important to 
make that distinction as we encounter both principles throughout the 
thesis. For example, the data subject is an entity class, while a 
particular data subject is an entity-instance. We are using the term 
"entity" in a way that differs from the way it is used in relational 
databases for example as it refers to agents as stated above and 
contains behavioural characteristics. 
 
3.1.5. Data Subject 
 
Definition 
The Data Subject is defined as "special case of entity who is interested 
in preserving a certain level of privacy upon his or her own personal 
information with regards to any other entity". This refers to the class 
level and not to a particular instance of that class. 
 
3.1.6. Resource 
 
Definition 
We define a resource as "any piece of information about an entity".  
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This definition includes personal and non-identifying information as it 
is necessary to look at both kinds of elements, particularly when 
combining them. 
 
3.1.7. Personal Information 
 
Definition 
Personal information is defined as "a resource with the potential to 
identify a particular identity, both standalone and in combination with 
other resources". 
 
3.1.8. Identity 
 
Definition 
We define "identity" as "an intentional accumulation of suitable 
personal information that together distinguish one entity from 
another".  
 
The need for identities has been widely acknowledged and is a 
mechanism used to create anonymity and pseudo-anonymity. The 
latter case is often used to participate under a certain pseudonym in 
certain transactions consistently, without revealing any or all personal 
information about the underlying real world entity. This may be as 
simple as a different name in online chats, a different email address in 
social networks or a falsified certificate of birth in the real world. We 
make no judgements about the rights and wrongs of using identities as 
this refers to legal issues as well as moral and ethical ones. In order to 
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eliminate fake identities that may be used to mislead people, we can 
utilize the mechanisms of trust and reputation [11]. 
 
3.1.9. Process 
 
Definition 
We define "process" as "any number of transactions performed by any 
number of entities to achieve a certain goal under certain conditions 
and restrictions".  
 
This is a very generic assumption of a process, but we will provide 
more specific details in the context of privacy at a later stage. 
 
3.1.10. Policy 
 
Definition 
A policy is "a repository of statements provided by an entity with a 
certain purpose about a particular resource intended for a particular 
audience or entity, which is valid for a particular timeframe".  
 
3.1.11. Consent 
 
Definition 
We define consent as "the mutual agreement between two or more 
entities about the conditions and purpose of certain resources".  
 
In many cases, consent is established between a data subject and 
another entity to define the conditions of usage of personal 
information for particular processes that involve the handling of 
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personal information. This is not just limited to usage and sharing of 
personal information. 
 
3.1.12. Repository 
 
Definition 
A repository is defined as the "total collection of resources" that is 
manifested in persistent storage. 
 
3.2. Privacy Principles 
 
We use privacy principles and its synonym "quality aspects" throughout the 
thesis to assess the level of privacy as elaborated earlier. We define them 
in accordance with [61]. It is important to mention that they vary between 
territories and legal boundaries. Researchers in this field acknowledge that 
the following ones are essential and provide a concise representation of 
the knowledge of the real world. 
 
3.2.1. Data Quality 
 
The data quality principle refers to the idea that processing of personal 
information is to comply with quality requirements. Therefore, the 
quality dimensions refer to personal information that is adequate, 
relevant, not excessive, correct and accurate to the purpose for which 
it is collected and subsequently processed. This includes the terms of 
storage, periodic clearing, information about corrections and 
disclosures to other parties, measures to minimize, detect and handle 
errors as well as an authorization inspection for data input. 
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3.2.2. Transparency 
 
The transparency principle refers to the idea that the data subject 
must be informed about what is done to his or her personal 
information. This includes the provision of information about the 
collection process before or during the collection when personal 
information is provided directly to the data subject; or if obtained 
indirectly and a notification is impossible or economically not viable, 
the recoding of the source of data. Furthermore, the purpose and need 
of the data collected and any third party involvement in its processing 
needs to be provided to the data subject. Finally, the legislatory 
framework upon which the data is collected needs to be provided. 
 
3.2.3. Intention and Notification 
 
This principle refers to the conditions of any intention to collect and 
the subsequent notification dimensions. This includes the timeliness of 
notifications, nature of processing, name and address of the data 
controller, the categories of resources that are (potentially) collected, 
the recipients of any resources, descriptions of any safeguards and the 
purpose of the resources. However, this principle is not used 
throughout the thesis any further as it defines preliminary 
requirements that have to be met (in certain countries and regions) 
before collection of personal information becomes legitimate. 
 
3.2.4. Finality Principle 
 
The finality principle states that personal information is collected for 
certain agreed purposes and may be used for these only. However, 
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there may be legal requirements to make the data available to other 
parties under special conditions. This may be a regulation relating to 
national security, but can also include the data subject's vital interests, 
like obtaining medial information in an emergency. The finality 
principle also provides rules to keep data only as long as necessary for 
the intended purpose or apply anonymization methods otherwise.  
 
3.2.5. Legitimate Grounds of Processing 
 
This principle refers to the idea that personal information may be 
collected and processed only if legitimate grounds can be found. This 
includes unambiguous consent from the data subject that must have 
been given without any pressure. Other grounds may be legal 
requirements or the protection of the vital interests of the data 
subject. It can also include reasons relating to public interests. There 
are some limitations to the collection that apply to specific categories 
that include, but are not limited to: religion, philosophical beliefs, race, 
political opinions, medical data, sex life, trade union memberships, 
data about criminal conviction and unlawful behaviour.  
 
3.2.6. Data Subject's rights 
 
The data subject has certain rights within the legal framework with 
regards to accessing, processing and rectification of personal 
information. They include information about how data processors 
process personal data, who the data is shared with and how they 
intend to use it. It also includes the rights of the data subject to 
request rectification, supplementation, deletion or blockage for 
personal information for certain or all purposes. Hence, it is important 
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to set time frames for the carrying out of the changes and notifications 
by the collector if adjustments cannot be made for certain other 
processors and third parties. 
 
3.2.7. Security 
 
The security principle requires data collectors and processors to 
implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to 
protect personal data against loss or any form of unlawful processing. 
Hence, it is important to emphasize that an adequate level of state-of-
the-art security to be applied, depending on the type and category of 
data and the nature and of the risk involved during processing.  
 
 
3.2.8. Accountability 
 
Any entity that is processing or handling personal information is 
accountable for the compliance with any of the principles listed. 
Therefore, the data subject can contact the entity or entities in 
question if its data has been processed or used not in accordance with 
those principles and may have legal rights to pursue action against the 
entity if not satisfied with the outcome. 
 
3.2.9. Openness 
 
This principle deals with the openness of information regarding 
policies and procedures. They need to be ready and available at all 
times for inspection by the data subject and/or relevant authorities. 
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3.2.10. Anonymity 
 
The privacy principle of anonymity refers to the idea that personal 
information must be transformed in such a way that identification is 
impossible afterwards. It may also be possible to apply pseudo-
anonymity in order to identify personal information within a certain 
processing domain and in such a way that they can be linked together 
by a trusted entity only. 
 
3.2.11. Transfer of personal information between different jurisdictions 
 
Legal privacy protection varies dramatically between different 
jurisdictions. Therefore, it is necessary to limit transfer of personal 
information to countries with lower privacy protection laws unless 
unambiguous consent has been given by the data subject or it is 
necessary for the fulfillment of a contract between the data subject 
and the processor. Furthermore, it may be required if it is in the vital 
interest of the data subject or is a legal requirement. 
 
3.3. Problem definition 
 
Privacy preservation is not just a technical problem. It involves different 
mechanisms on different levels. It is necessary to take the entities 
processing and their jurisdiction into account. It is also necessary to look at 
the preferences of the individual users with regards to their own 
preference for privacy protection as it as an endogenous conception. 
However, it is difficult for system developers and data processors to obtain 
a partial, much less a complete understanding of the different concepts 
and dimensions of privacy as many are not experts in that domain. This is 
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especially true when operating on a global scale where requirements 
change between different countries and may fluctuate with cultures. 
However, it is necessary to understand privacy principles in order to adhere 
to them and build a system that is compliant with the different rules and 
regulations and is transparent enough for data subjects.  
 
3.3.1. Summary of problem definition 
 
This thesis addresses the problem of capturing the knowledge in the field 
of privacy, with its concepts and relationships. This is done in a way that 
permits (semi-)automatic processing and evaluation of privacy protection 
levels experienced. This helps with the user experience with regards to 
privacy preservation and can be used by users to apply their privacy related 
preferences across multiple application domains. It also assists application 
developers to adhere to privacy legislations in a particular regulatory 
environment.  
 
The research questions that need to be tackled so that all the different 
aspects of this problem are addressed are therefore: 
1) "How do we represent the various privacy concepts and relationships 
and the way they link up with each other?" 
2) "How can such a representation be used to increase the level of privacy 
preservation for the data subject?" 
3) "How can such a representation be used by system developers and 
service providers to achieve compliance with current rules and regulations 
as well as state of the art techniques to safeguard personal information?" 
4) "How can this representation be used throughout various application 
domains and provide cross-domain privacy preservation experiences?" 
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We strongly acknowledge and have mentioned previously the need to 
involve legislation and regulatory frameworks in this work. However, as we 
are not experts in the legal domain, we cannot provide a semantic 
framework for this purpose, but will limit this work to some simple 
examples from the legal domain. It would be beneficial (and we will 
consider this in future works) to conceptualize the various legal privacy 
requirements on an abstract level that can be used (semi-) automatically to 
derive knowledge from that domain. 
 
In order to look at the different levels and to determine privacy 
preservation requirements and the level of privacy experienced by 
individuals, it is necessary to represent the knowledge in the domain within 
a conceptual framework. 
 
3.4. Choice of methodology to problem solving 
 
In this section, we describe the methods for problem solving in information 
systems. As privacy is such a diverse and endogenous conception that 
varies across different application domains, we need to solve the research 
issue by following a systematic scientific approach, namely science- and 
engineering-based research methodologies. Therefore, we will give an 
overview of existing methods justify our choice of methods. 
 
One could choose several different approaches to represent this privacy 
knowledge and they include: 1) Natural Language Processing (NLP); 2) 
Mathematical representations; and, 3) Knowledge representation, which 
can be categorised further. This discussion is elaborated below. 
 
3.4.1. Natural language processing 
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Natural language processing refers to the extraction and processing of 
knowledge from normal written text without any particular structure 
or schema behind it. In the field of privacy, privacy policies as well as 
legal documents provide a source for such an approach. Therefore, 
one could assume that using NLP techniques to extract the relevant 
keywords and passages could yield in a determination of the level of 
privacy experienced. However, this does not make use of the inferred 
knowledge from the different privacy concepts and how these work 
together. Additionally, the concepts and relationships might not be 
exposed and easily visible. It is also very difficult to apply these to 
different application domains without major changes. As the 
documents in question are not precise either and have different 
terminology that might even change throughout the document, NLP 
seems to be insufficient to help solve the privacy preservation 
problem. Finally, not all sources that determine privacy implications 
are written in plain text and therefore they could not contribute to this 
process. 
 
3.4.2. Mathematical representation 
 
A mathematical representation of privacy would be most likely be 
unsatisfactory. This is due to the endogenous nature of privacy and 
how it varies across different people, countries and application 
domains. It also changes over time and with changing requirements 
and preferences of a particular data subject, it may require new 
technologies and concepts that have not been created or used 
previously. This would make it necessary to provide new mathematical 
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calculations every time a new application domain is introduced or new 
technologies evolve that enhance the privacy preservation experience. 
 
3.4.3. Knowledge representation 
 
Knowledge representation seems to be a good way to deal with 
privacy across different application domains. It usually requires experts 
in the domain to collect, structure and apply the knowledge 
appropriately and provide guidelines on how to use it. This may be 
done semi-automatically or collectively by a community. 
 
3.4.4. Glossary of terms 
 
An initial idea to represent privacy and its different concepts 
could be a glossary of terms. This is done by an expert in the 
domain and lists all the different concepts. Furthermore, it 
provides synonyms and acronyms as found in the domain and 
relates them to each other. It can also describe the various 
attributes of concepts. However, a pure glossary of terms would 
not assist us in achieving our goal here as there are no 
taxonomies among the concepts or any kind of relations between 
the different concepts - except synonyms and acronyms of 
course. Without taxonomies and relations it is impossible to 
determine or even infer anything from the concepts provided. 
Although it is fairly easy to extend such a glossary by simply 
adding new concepts, it would be impossible to process them in 
any kind of automated way as the processing agent would by no 
means be able to understand them. 
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3.4.4.1. Topic Maps 
 
According to Wikipedia, Topic Maps is a "standard for the 
representation and interchange of knowledge, with an emphasis 
on the findability of information" [62]. They are basically used to 
link and associate different concepts together and provide 
information resources to a particular concept. While this may 
appear to be a viable approach, it does not seem to support our 
need to define the allowable types in order to categorize and 
evaluate privacy preserving mechanisms. This makes it hard to 
maintain a sufficient structure throughout the knowledge 
representation, especially for large bases that can be extended 
properly and still be used by relevant applications without 
modifications. 
 
3.4.4.2. Ontologies 
 
The previous mentioned approaches are all good starting points 
to represent knowledge in the relevant domain. However, they 
lack a certain structure and associations among the concepts and 
attributes described. According to Guarino et al., an ontology is "a 
formal shared, explicit, but partial specification of the commonly 
agreed upon intended meaning of a conceptualisation" [27]. The 
ontology approach fits well with our requirements of 
representing knowledge in a particular domain and structuring it 
appropriately. Building ontologies however, can be achieved by 
different methodologies and the one we have chosen is 
METHONTOLOGY [63]. The fact that - to our knowledge - no other 
ontology exists in the area of privacy and METHONTOLOGY 
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supports building an ontology from scratch, makes it a candidate 
of choice. Furthermore, the METHONTOLOGY approach also 
allows us to incorporate knowledge during the building process in 
form of other ontologies from other domains. This is true 
especially in application domains, but also by adding upper 
ontologies to make it compliant and compatible with already 
established core and application domain-independent concepts.  
Finally, the METHONTOLOGY approach allows us to design the 
ontology in an implementation independent way, thus allowing 
one choose the most appropriate and perhaps standardized 
language or most widely accepted language. In order to develop 
proof of concept, we had to select an implementation language 
and a tool to help with the development. The tool for 
implementation selected was Protégé which, amongst others, 
generates code in the Web Ontology Language (OWL), which 
represents the generic privacy ontology. OWL is a standard of the 
W3C to  define ontologies on the implementation level on the 
semantic web and therefore a suitable language for our 
implementation as it is widely accepted and standardized and 
based upon XML. Naturally, every language and its 
implementation has its own limits and restrictions and slight 
alterations had to be done to some ontological concepts and 
associations to conform to these when entering them in Protégé. 
However, the modifications are merely of a technical nature and 
would not impact on the expressiveness or the semantics of the 
ontology. An instance of such an alteration is the lack of support 
for trinary (or higher) associations between concepts in OWL, and 
therefore, intermediate concepts are created to support such 
association types.  
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4. Solution Overview / Roadmap 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the solution provided by this thesis and can 
be seen as a roadmap for understanding the different components and their 
interaction. We start by showing the initial development of the ontology 
followed by the concepts and relations that have been identified.  
 
4.1. Ontology development 
 
As elaborated in Chapter 3, an ontology is a feasible method for capturing 
and structuring the knowledge in the domain of privacy. As we have opted 
to use METHONTOLOGY as our development methodology, the glossary of 
terms and relations had to be established from the domain knowledge. We 
have used various documents from the legal sector, including the "Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data" [16] and the "OECD 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data" [64], in addition to research work carried out by the PRIME [61] and 
PISA [65] projects as viable sources for those concepts. Although 
mentioned in these documents, many concepts appear to be mostly 
unstructured, sprinkled throughout the documents without detailed 
rigorous definitions of the concepts and relationships. We clearly address 
this lack of precision. We facilitate the privacy principles as our quality 
aspect measures and include Data Quality, Transparency, Intention and 
Notification, Finality Principle, Legitimate Grounds of Processing, Data 
subject's rights, Security, Accountability, Openness, Anonymity and finally, 
Transfer of personal information between different jurisdictions as defined 
in Chapter 3 and discussed in our previous work [66]. 
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4.2. Ontology architecture 
 
The general idea behind our approach is that there is a distinction between 
knowledge in the domain of privacy and its application in specific domains 
as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Real world situation 
 
The notion of privacy in a domain such as medicine or health will be 
somewhat different from that in e-business. Notwithstanding this there are 
certain core concepts which are common to all application domains. This 
leads us to propose an architecture as depicted in Figure 2 with:  
1. a generic ontology which has a representation of the core concepts 
of privacy 
2. specialized ontologies which represent commitments to the 
concepts of the generic ontology but which, in addition, describe 
specialized constraints, concepts and relationships pertinent to the 
application domain. 
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Figure 2: Real world representation 
 
This idea of separating certain elements into a generic ontology and 
specialized extensions, the ontology commitment, is not new and has been 
successfully proposed, implemented and used by various authors, like 
Spyns et al. [28, 67] or Wouters et al. [68]. The approach was first proposed 
by [67] in an attempt to decompose an ontology into "an ontology base, 
which holds (multiple) intuitive conceptualisation(s) of a domain, and a 
layer of ontological commitments, where each commitment holds a set of 
domain rules". Hence, a classical database model-theoretical view is 
adopted. It separates the conceptual relationships from the domain rules, 
which are conceptually moved to the application domain. Each of the 
ontology commitments in turn mediates between the generic ontology and 
the application domain ontology. 
 
The generic privacy ontology (GPO) with the core privacy concepts are 
completely application domain independent. The privacy concepts within 
the core privacy ontology have relationships with the privacy principles, 
which we commonly refer to as "quality aspects" as described in [11] and 
"influence" their values. As discussed above, privacy is not a 
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mathematically precise definition, and therefore we make use of fuzzy 
terminology when assigning levels of influence to the privacy principles. As 
the generic privacy ontology is application domain independent, the 
influential values assigned are not just fuzzy, but also have a relative 
character. A certain concept or process within the generic privacy ontology 
influences a particular privacy principle without actually having a need to 
state proper value, for example; this means that the use of that particular 
concept has a certain influence on the associated privacy principle, which 
needs to be specified more precisely in the extension. We will provide the 
different levels of influence, which refers to the quality assessment criteria 
in chapter 5. Each privacy principle has certain quality assessment criteria 
that are not necessarily disjoint from the assessment criteria of other 
principles. Therefore, the different aspects influence each other in addition 
to the influences experienced by the concepts of the generic privacy 
ontology.  
 
With the assistance of the core privacy ontology itself, we cannot evaluate 
the different levels of privacy experienced due to the relative nature of the 
influential levels. Therefore, the generic privacy ontology needs to be 
extended for a particular application domain by a domain expert. This is 
also known as ontology commitment as the specialized ontology commits 
to using all the higher-level ontology concepts and specifications. The 
domain expert would either use an existing ontology from the application 
domain or would have to create a new one in the domain if no suitable one 
were available. This application domain ontology (ADO) is then used to 
derive the concepts for the application domain privacy ontology that is 
based upon the generic privacy ontology. This needs to be done once 
during its initial creation and whenever new technologies emerge in that 
domain or the domain concepts evolve. A domain expert is therefore 
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guided by the generic privacy ontology and can assign more concrete 
values to the influential relationships as depicted in Figure 3. The 
terminology of influence used here is comprised of "very high", "high", 
"medium", "low", "unknown", "yes", "no" or "not stated", but can also 
include proper values that define a certain assessment criteria like "health 
data", to which a value from a scale from 1 to 5 is assigned. However, it is 
not necessary to use all of the quality assessment criteria levels, as a subset 
for each might suffice, depending on the actual principles. This is then 
described on a star scale, where we assign five stars to a level of "very 
high" and one star to "unknown". 
 
Figure 3: Privacy principles influenced by ADPO 
 
In addition to the influences assigned by the generic privacy ontology and 
its extensions, the privacy principles are also influenced by external factors 
that may be application domain independent. This is shown in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4: External influences 
 
One of the examples for such an external influence is the derivation from 
legal documents. We cannot use legal documents in their natural language 
form due to the same principle problems we elaborated in Chapter 3. 
Basically, it is difficult to extract knowledge from natural language 
documents and the concepts and relationships may not be exposed easily. 
Furthermore, due to the number of legal and regulatory documents in the 
area of privacy (in any area in general), conflicts occur that cannot be 
solved automatically with ease and without loss of knowledge. For 
example, where a federal legal document may provide protection for a 
certain area, a state document may do the inverse and therefore a conflict 
exists. Unfortunately, these types of conflicts are frequent and can involve 
multiple simultaneously. In general, we assume that the most restrictive of 
the documents apply, and we do not consider the others as it is our belief 
that privacy protection cannot be strong enough. In order to automate the 
whole process, a legal ontology would need to be built that can encompass 
the various concepts and knowledge of legal documents, but this may 
never be completely achievable due to the way those documents are 
written - in a fairly open, imprecise (as in non-concrete) and interpretable 
way. 
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The following figure describes our conceptual approach as just discussed 
on a high and abstract level.  
 
 
Figure 5: Ontology big picture 
 
As discussed in the definition of privacy in Chapter 3, privacy is in essence 
about the power to control the release of personal information in line with 
the interests and values of the data subject. Therefore, the most basic 
principles are "Entity", "Resource" and "Data Subject" as defined in Chapter 
3 and depicted in Figure 6. Entity is therefore a very general concept, which 
refers to any kind of agent, person, company or other individual. Hence, a 
Data Subject is a more specialized version of Entity as it has all the common 
properties, such as a jurisdiction by which the entity is bound. In simpler 
terms, a resource is defined as information about a data subject - although 
its formal definition is more complex as elaborated in the previous chapter.  
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Figure 6: Entity, Data Subject and Resource 
 
The idea depicted in Figure 6 is very basic and only makes the statement 
that a resource is about a data subject, which basically means that the 
resource contains personal information (to some extent) regarding the 
data subject. The second statement is that another entity can access that 
resource. This does not provide any constraints or any other requirements 
under which the resource may be accessed. 
 
A data subject might not necessarily want to be known by its resource and 
on the other hand, the accessing entity might not want to reveal its identity 
to access information, perhaps of general nature only. Thus, we need to 
introduce the concept of identities. Both sides - the data subject and the 
entity accessing the resources - will want to control how they are identified 
- remembering that we are concerned only with business and not 
government transactions. The logical action is to associate a set of 
identities with every entity - which in turn applies to the data subject as it is 
an entity after all. Furthermore, an entity with multiple identities can act 
differently depending on the one it is using and the context in which it is 
used. The entity can even choose to remain anonymous if necessary. We 
can categorize identities themselves as either identifying the entity behind 
it or not. We call these two categories "IdentifiabaleEntityIdentity" and 
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"NonIdentifiabaleEntityIdentity" respectively. We can distinguish the latter 
one even further by categorizing it into a pseudo-anonymous identity and a 
completely anonymous one. We call them 
"PseudoAnonymousEntityIdentity" and "AnonymousEntityIdentity". The 
major difference between the latter two is that the pseudo-anonymous 
one can be reused multiple times, while the other cannot as it has no 
elements that could associate one instance with another. The anonymous 
one is usually used once and thus leaves no traces between different 
(trans)actions. We show these concepts and relationships in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7: Different categories of identities 
 
The different categories of identities also relate to the data subject's 
different type or category of resources. A resource can potentially identify 
a data subject directly, or, even better, can identify one of the data 
subject's identities, which might be congruent with the data subject him- or 
herself. On the other hand, a resource might not identify the data subject 
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but just one of its pseudo-identities. We show this conceptual hierarchy in 
Figure 8.  
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Figure 8: Resources and Identities 
 
Evaluating the identity category to which a resource belongs may not be a 
precise process and may be classified by the domain expert or by the data 
subject. For example, an email address can be a pseudo-anonymous 
resource as well as an identifying one, and, in general, the data subject can 
choose whether to use an email address with identifying characteristics. 
Nevertheless, different identity and resource categories are mandatory 
concepts for the generic privacy ontology as they support anonymity (one 
of the privacy principles) and allow participating entities to decide how 
they will appear in transactions with others or how others see them. 
 
Having elaborated most of the important core concepts and some of the 
relationships of the generic ontology, we will provide further details about 
attributes and associated relationships within the core ontology and 
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between the concepts and the privacy principles in Chapter 5. This is then 
followed by application domain specific commitments of the generic 
privacy ontology in Chapters 6 and 7 for two different application domains.  
 
4.3. Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a broad overview of the proposed solution and our 
approach to it. We discussed the idea of a generic privacy ontology and an 
application domain specific privacy ontology, which is reflected as an 
ontology commitment to the generic one. We then provided the main core 
concepts that are application domain independent and therefore belong to 
the generic privacy ontology. We also discussed the issues of external 
influences on the privacy principles, and an example from the 
conceptualisation of legal documents was described.  
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5. Generic Privacy Ontology - in details 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, we elaborated the main idea of a generic privacy 
ontology and its ontology commitment for application domains. We 
described some of the main concepts within the generic privacy ontology, 
such as Data Subject, Resource and Entity. The following sections will 
provide a greater level of detail for all of these concepts as well as all 
additional concepts in the generic ontology not described in Chapter 4. 
Throughout the thesis, we will use the following notion: 
 
generalisation
association
composition
inheritance
 
              Figure 9: Legend 
 
 
5.2. Ontology concepts 
 
The concept of Entity was briefly described earlier. An entity represents the 
concept of a general and abstract agent, person, individual or company. It 
can also refer to a group of entities. The class entity has an association with 
the concept "GroupOrIndividual" as depicted in Figure 10. This association 
allows us to refer to a single instance of Entity during our evaluation at a 
later stage that is actually associated with more than one entity. This is 
necessary if an entity consists of multiple entities. We have to use an 
association here as we further refine (specialize) the concept of entity 
further at a later stage and both Group and Individual are already 
specializations of GroupOrIndividual. Hence, the group concept is just a 
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container that can hold multiple entities, which can be cascaded if 
necessary. The concept of Individual does not only refer to human beings, 
but can include any type of real world or digital agent, person or provider. 
 
Entity
Group Individual
hasO
neO
rM
oreEntities
GroupOrIndividual
repr
ese
nts
 
Figure 10: Entity and GroupOrIndividual concepts 
 
Every entity has an association named "jurisdiction" that defines to which 
territory an entity belongs - see Figure 11. Territory therefore refers to a 
specific country or region of the world in most of the cases. An entity can 
belong to one or more territories at any given time. However, if, for 
example, an entity is a multi-national one that operates internationally and 
multiple distinct territories would apply, we simply use the grouping 
mechanism from Figure 10 and group them together such that a separate 
instance appears for every occurrence of that entity in every territory. 
Every territory has specific judicatures, and hence its own particular privacy 
protection laws and regulations that apply. These significantly influence the 
level of privacy protection. As it is beyond the scope if this thesis to 
develop an ontology for privacy protection laws, we assume that it can be 
done in general but, in the following chapters, we refer only to a few 
examples that have been developed for this particular purpose.  
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Figure 11: Entity and Territory 
 
5.2.1. Entity hierarchy 
 
In most cases, an entity is accessing or processing personal information of a 
data subject. Therefore, we have to define various subclasses of entities to 
deal with different access types or privileges and the implications for the 
privacy principles with regards to that type of access. The whole hierarchy 
of is shown in Figure 12. 
 
Entity
ResourceAccessor
ResourceUser
DataSubject
ResourceAuthoriser
ResourceReader ResourceAdder ResourceDeleter
ResourceModifier
NonAliveDataSubjectAliveDataSubject
ResourceHandler
 
Figure 12: Entity hierarchy 
 
The first level down from the entity is classified as "ResourceAccessor", 
which represents the concept of an entity that will deal with personal 
information at some stage. Hence, the accessor cannot read, alter or delete 
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and information, but can only pass it on to others. The accessor has 
knowledge about having personal information, but knows neither the 
content nor to whom it belongs as the content is unavailable - see Figure 
13. An example of such an accessor in real world terms would be the 
mailman in the real world or an email service provider in the digital world.  
 
Entity
Resource
know
sAbout
ResourceAccessor
 
Figure 13: ResourceAccessor 
 
A "ResourceUser" is the next logical step down in the hierarchy. This 
concept classifies an entity as knowing the identity of the data subject. The 
identity may or may not be congruent with the actual data subject. In most 
cases, a resource user is also a recipient of personal information, but 
cannot access that personal information as such.  
 
A "ResourceAuthoriser" is an entity that can control the release of personal 
information on behalf of a data subject. This can be seen as power of 
attorney for multiple reasons.  
ResourceAuthoriser
ResourceAuthoriserByLaw LawregulatedBy
ResourceauthorisesAccessTo
 
Figure 14: ResourceAuthoriser 
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Reasons include legal requirements as well as power in the case where the 
data subject is unfit or unable to control it him- or herself. For example, 
this could be a parent controlling the release of personal information about 
a minor / child. The authoriser does not necessarily have the ability to read 
or alter the personal information controlled. However, as it needs to know 
about the identity of the personal information, it is only logical that it be a 
specialization of the ResourceUser. The actual process of sharing personal 
information is described below. Furthermore, a specialized type of the 
ResourceAuthoriser exists as depicted in Figure 14, which is called 
"ResourceAuthoriserByLaw". This particular concept is used in cases where 
legal requirements demand the control of personal information. The legal 
requirements are modeled by the different laws and regulations, but we 
simply refer to the actual law without proper semantic modeling as this 
would exceed the scope of this thesis. 
 
The concept of "DataSubject" is one of the core concepts in this ontology. 
Resources are about data subjects in general and it is the desire of the data 
subjects to control their own personal information - the resources - 
consistent with own their values as described in the definition of privacy in 
Chapter 3. As different laws in different countries describe privacy 
protection differently, it is necessary to distinguish between data subjects 
that are "alive" and data subjects that are not alive. Therefore, "alive" is 
used in the context of human beings only as privacy protection by law 
varies according to the living state of a person. For example, in some 
countries, privacy protection laws cease to apply with the death of a 
person. In the digital world, we use the term similarly as, in general, digital 
data subjects represent human beings at some point. If the entity is not a 
human being but a corporation, we assume it to be alive as long as it exists 
in its form. The second implication of an "alive" data subject is the ability to 
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control personal information, which can no longer be done by someone 
who is dead. Therefore, an "alive" data subject is also a 
ResourceAuthoriser. This is ultimately true in most case, as it is the data 
subject who is to control his or her own information. A number of cases 
exist where this is not true, for example if the data subject is legally or 
otherwise unfit to do so as explained in the previous section.  
 
So far, it is not actually possible to access personal information and be able 
to read or alter the content, apart from the data subject, who is able to do 
so in most cases. The concept of "ResourceReader" represents an entity 
that knows about the identity of a data subject (which can be pseudo-
anonymous or fully anonymous) and can access some or all parts for 
certain purposes and under certain conditions. As these conditions and 
purposes are merely resources or meta-resources, we describe them below 
in greater detail. In general however, the conditions and purposes of 
reading personal information are always attached to it directly. A 
ResourceReader does not have the ability to alter personal information; 
this is done by the entity represented by the concepts of "ResourceAdder" 
and "ResourceDeleter" respectively. While the former can only amend 
information, the latter can only delete it. Combining all of the concepts of 
"ResourceReader", "ResoureAdder" and "ResourceDeleter" leads to the 
concept of "ResourceModifier", which is an entity able to modify resources 
under certain conditions and for certain purposes as defined by a 
"ResourceAuthoriser" or the data subject as depicted in Figure 15.  
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Figure 15: ResourceHandler and Modifier 
 
We have an additional concept in this hierarchy, which is called 
"ResourceHandler". Such an entity is a specialized type of a 
"ResourceReader". The entity represented by this concept has the ability to 
read personal information under certain conditions and for certain 
purposes, as described above, but can also transform them without 
altering the actual content. This is useful in cases where personal 
information need to be translated from one format to another, such as 
from one language to a different one, or from a physical form into digital 
one or vice versa. The ResourceHandler has no other privileges and cannot 
reveal personal information to any other entity. This may seem to be 
contradictory as an interpreter, for example, translates information and 
gives it to someone else. However, we regard this as the interpreter 
translating it for the data subject and the data subject then forwarding it to 
other entities. A ResourceHandler therefore has additional attributes, 
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which are trust and reputation as well as quality. The former ones refer to 
the trust and belief in reputation that a data subject has for the handler 
with regards to handling his or her information, while the latter refers to 
the actual quality the handler delivers and the accuracy of the outcome. 
This is important in particular where transformations cannot be done with 
one hundred percent accuracy and it is up to the handler to perform well. 
 
5.2.2. Resources 
 
We described the resource concept in Chapter 4, but will provide more 
detail here. The concept of resource is an abstract one that identifies the 
abstract concept of DataSubjectIdentity as depicted in Figure 16. 
 
DataSubjectResource
ResourceElement
hasElem
ents
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Safeguard
protectedB
ySafeguar
d
isA
 
Figure 16: Resource, Identity and Safeguard 
 
A resource is associated with a number of ResourceElements that contain 
the actual information. They, in turn, can be used to identify certain 
identities as described earlier. Every resource is associated with and hence 
protected by the concept of "Safeguard". The ontology caters for four types 
of safeguard categories: "TransitSafeguard", "NonTransitSafeguard", 
"AccessSafeguard" and "NoSafeguard". The concept of resource is 
associated with a "NonTransitSafeguard" as shown in Figure 17, as a 
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resource refers to data that is not in transit. Examples for such a 
"NonTransitSafeguard" may be "AES-Encryption" in the digital world or 
"A4-Envelope" in the real world. Both are concepts of storage safeguards 
that prevent unauthorized access to the information they protect at 
various levels of protection. The level of protection that a particular 
safeguard provides is reflected by the security privacy principle and is part 
of the evaluation process determining the level of privacy preservation. In 
the example above, we would consider "AES-Encryption" as a safeguard 
with a protection level of "high", while an envelope may be awarded a 
protection level of "low". As with all other concepts, this mechanism is 
extendible and new safeguards can be added as needed and as technology 
evolves. We will provide further examples of safeguards throughout the 
chapter as deemed appropriate. 
Resource ResourceElementhasElements
protectedBySafeguard
Safeguard
NonTransitSafeguard TransitSafeguardNoSafeguard AccessSafeguard
 
Figure 17: Resource and Safeguard 
 
However, security is only one part of privacy protection. A second part is 
the purpose for which personal information has been collected. This is 
modeled by the concept of policy. A policy is a specialized type of resource 
and therefore is usually protected by safeguards as well. In addition and 
from an abstract point of view, a policy applies to the concept of resource 
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as shown in Figure 18. Although a policy is a resource, it does not usually 
apply to itself, meaning the policy and the resource with which it is 
associated with are disjoint. 
 
Resource
appliesToResource
Policy isA
 
Figure 18: Policy and Resource 
 
 
A policy in the ontology is more complex, however. A policy is defined and 
issued by a particular entity and has a set of statements that on their own 
have one or more purposes, one or more recipients, a certain retention 
and are about a resource (see Figure 19). Examples for purposes are 
numerous and we have used P3P as an example to determine some 
categories and show them in Figure 20. 
Policy StatementhasOneOrMore
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Figure 19: Policy 
 
 
We define the concept of Repository as a container that contains a number 
of resources and one or more associated policies. This is useful to store the 
policies under which certain personal information has been collected 
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together with the actual information. This helps to ensure that intended 
use is congruent with the purpose. 
p3p:CurrentPurpose
p3p:AdminPurpose
p3p:DevlopmentPurpose
TailoringPurpose
NoPurpose
OtherPurpose
TelemarketingPurpose
HistoricalPurpose
ContactPurpose
Individual-decisionPurpose
Individual-analysisPurpose
Pseudo-decisionPurpose
Pseudo-analysisPurpose
p3p
Purpose
 
Figure 20: Purposes in the P3P domain 
 
5.3. Privacy Processes 
 
The generic privacy ontology contains the concept of privacy processes. 
These processes represent different tasks or transactions that occur 
frequently when processing personal information and can be extended 
when necessary. A PrivacyProcess is defined as an abstract concept that is 
about a resource and performed by a particular identity of an entity, 
governed by a particular policy and protected by a safeguard as shown in 
Figure 21. Actual processes derive from this basic conceptualization and 
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add their own associations. An example of such a process is the 
"ShareResourceProcess" as shown in Figure 22. In addition to the elements 
above, it has an association with the ResourceAuthoriser (e.g. the data 
subject) who is permitted to share the resources, and an entity as the 
recipient of the data. As an entity can be an individual or a group, 
simultaneous sharing with multiple parties is possible. However, the 
conditions of sharing may require the involvement of multiple sharing 
processes if entities reside in different territories or have other properties 
that may differ from each other. This can then be governed by different 
policies in the privacy process. 
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Figure 21: Privacy Process 
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Figure 22: ShareResource Process 
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5.4. Detailed illustration 
 
Before we describe the privacy principles and the influence of the various 
concepts in the ontology, we will describe a few concepts in greater detail. 
So far, we have omitted most of the attributes of most of the concepts in 
order to limit ourselves to the ideas behind them and avoid too many 
technical details. However, we will show some technical details now for 
some concepts, while the complete set of technical details can be found 
within our implementation of the ontology, written in OWL. Some more 
pseudo code snippets will also be provided in the following chapters to 
assist with the understanding. However, the basic principles and ideas 
should be clear without these technical details, which may distract from, 
rather than assist the discussion. The examples below are described in an 
implementation-independent manner as we describe our choice of 
implementation language in Chapter 8.  
 
As a first example, we highlight the "Entity" concept:  
The concept of entity has a single attribute named "id", which is an 
arbitrary identifier that identifies instances of this concept. We choose an 
arbitrary value here as an entity is not supposed to have any identifying 
characteristics of the actual individual. Entity also has three associations. 
The first one is named "represents" with a cardinality of one and associates 
the concept of "GroupOrIndividual" with this concept. The second 
association is named "isInJurisdiction" with a cardinality of one or more 
and associates Entity with the concept of "Territory", which defines the 
governing country or region(s) by which this entity is bound. As the 
cardinality allows for more than one, it supports the entity being located in 
multiple regions at the same time, for example a particular state and a 
particular country (in which that state is located). This then allows us to 
apply different privacy regulations from the various territories. The third 
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association is named "hasIdentity" and is an association with a cardinality 
of one or more and associates Entity with the concept of "Identity", 
meaning that every identity can have an arbitrary number of identities. 
 
Our second example describes the concept of Identity: 
 
The main concept of Identity is abstract and contains an arbitrary identifier 
"id" only. A specialization or subclass of Identity is 
"IdentifiableEntityIdentity", which contains several attributes that uniquely 
identify the entity behind them. Its first attribute "id" is inherited from its 
super-class "Identity" and used in the same way as before. The second 
attribute is named "name" and is a string with a cardinality of one that 
describes the actual and real name of this identity and hence, entity. The 
third attribute is named "dateOfBirth" and has a cardinality of zero or one 
and describes the date of birth. We use a cardinality of zero or one here to 
allow for application domain commitments to use identity for both persons 
(having a date of birth) and non-person (e.g. companies, not having a date 
of birth). The fourth attribute is "locality" and has a cardinality of one and 
describes the location of the identity. It is noteworthy that this is not the 
same as the territorial association of the entity concept.  
 
In general however, most of the concepts in the generic privacy ontology 
have as few attributes as possible in an attempt to make it as application 
domain-independent as possible and the commitments add attributes as 
required. The only attribute that is available to all concepts is "id", which, 
as shown, is an arbitrary identifier for the particular instance of that 
concept. 
 
5.5. The Privacy Principles 
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We have listed the privacy principles in previous chapters, but provide a 
more detailed description here. This includes the various quality 
assessment aspects that are used to determine the level of privacy 
experienced. The top level of our evaluation contains the quality aspect 
that is evaluated. On the second level, this is followed by the different 
quality assessment criteria, which in turn have certain possible assignments 
- shown as third level items. The assignments themselves do not qualify the 
outcome of any privacy preservation evaluation process as such. The 
individual influence measurement determines this. 
 
One of the privacy principles, "Intention and Notification", is distinct from 
this notion as it is usually not used during every transaction that involves 
personal information, but is more a preliminary requirement in certain 
countries to start collecting personal information. Therefore, although we 
have listed it below, it is not actively used by the ontology as such. 
However, data collectors and processors may need to adhere to the 
different aspects of this principle individually as deemed appropriate. 
 
5.5.1. Data Quality (Quality Aspect 1) 
5.5.1.1. Adequate (Quality assessment criteria 1) 
5.5.1.1.1. Yes, fully:  
5.5.1.1.2. No / Not stated:  
5.5.1.2. Relevance to purpose (Quality assessment criteria 2) 
5.5.1.2.1. Very High:  
5.5.1.2.2. High:  
5.5.1.2.3. Medium:  
5.5.1.2.4. Low:  
5.5.1.2.5. None / Unknown:  
5.5.1.3. Correctness (Quality assessment criteria 3) 
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5.5.1.3.1. Very High:  
5.5.1.3.2. High:  
5.5.1.3.3. Medium:  
5.5.1.3.4. Low:  
5.5.1.3.5. Not at all / Unknown:  
5.5.2.  Security (Quality Aspect 2) 
5.5.2.1. Safeguards adequate (Quality assessment criteria 1) 
5.5.2.1.1. Very high:  
5.5.2.1.2. High:  
5.5.2.1.3. Medium:  
5.5.2.1.4. Low:  
5.5.2.1.5. None / Not stated:  
5.5.2.2. Security policy adequate 
5.5.2.2.1. Yes, fully -  
5.5.2.2.2. No / Not stated  
5.5.2.3. Data destruction policy adequate 
5.5.2.3.1. Yes, fully -  
5.5.2.3.2. No / Not stated  
5.5.2.4. Contingency plan adequate 
5.5.2.4.1. Yes, fully -  
5.5.2.4.2. No / Not stated  
5.5.2.5. Personnel requirements adequate 
5.5.2.5.1. Yes, fully -  
5.5.2.5.2. No / Not stated  
5.5.2.6. Privacy enhancing technologies adequate 
5.5.2.6.1. Yes, fully -  
5.5.2.6.2. None used / Not stated  
5.5.2.7. ICT infrastructure adequate 
5.5.2.7.1. Yes, fully -  
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5.5.2.7.2. No / Not stated  
5.5.3. Data subject's rights 
5.5.3.1. Access privileges to own data 
5.5.3.1.1. Full:  
5.5.3.1.2. Most:  
5.5.3.1.3. Some:  
5.5.3.1.4. Few:  
5.5.3.1.5. None / Unknown:  
5.5.3.2. Level of ability to request 
rectifications/supplementations/deletions 
5.5.3.2.1. Very High:  
5.5.3.2.2. High:  
5.5.3.2.3. Medium:  
5.5.3.2.4. Low:  
5.5.3.2.5. None / Not Stated:  
5.5.3.3. Ability to block content for certain purposes 
5.5.3.3.1. Yes:  
5.5.3.3.2. No / Not stated:  
5.5.3.4. Ability to object against processing 
5.5.3.4.1. Yes:  
5.5.3.4.2. Partly:  
5.5.3.4.3. No / Not stated:  
5.5.4. Legitimate Grounds of Processing 
5.5.4.1. Unambiguous consent 
5.5.4.1.1. Yes  
5.5.4.1.2. No  
5.5.4.2. Processing to fulfill contract requirement 
5.5.4.2.1. Yes  
5.5.4.2.2. No  
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5.5.4.3. Legal reasons 
5.5.4.3.1. Yes - refer to reason  
5.5.4.3.2. No  
5.5.4.4. Protection of vital interest of data subject 
5.5.4.4.1. Yes - refer to reason  
5.5.4.4.2. No  
5.5.4.5. Data belongs to following sensitive category  
5.5.4.5.1. Religion: 
5.5.4.5.2. Philosophical beliefs:  
5.5.4.5.3. Race:  
5.5.4.5.4. Political Opinions:  
5.5.4.5.5. Medical Data:  
5.5.4.5.6. Sex life:  
5.5.4.5.7. Trade union memberships:  
5.5.4.5.8. Data about criminal convictions or unlawful 
behaviour:  
5.5.4.5.9. No:  
5.5.5. Transparency 
5.5.5.1. Data obtained directly notify of processing 
5.5.5.1.1. Before collection:  
5.5.5.1.2. During collection:  
5.5.5.1.3. After collection:  
5.5.5.1.4. Never:  
5.5.5.2. Data obtained indirectly notify of processing 
5.5.5.2.1. Source of data known:  
5.5.5.2.2. Source of data unknown:  
5.5.5.3. Identity of processor revealed 
5.5.5.3.1. Yes:  
5.5.5.3.2. No:  
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5.5.5.4. Purpose of data stated 
5.5.5.4.1. yes:  
5.5.5.4.2. partly:  
5.5.5.4.3. no:  
5.5.5.5. Recording in accordance with law 
5.5.5.5.1. Yes - refer to law(s):  
5.5.5.5.2. No - specify reason:  
5.5.5.6. Third party involved 
5.5.5.6.1. yes - specify which  
5.5.5.6.2. no:  
5.5.5.7. Ability to object to involve third party 
5.5.5.7.1. Yes:  
5.5.5.7.2. No:  
5.5.6. Finality principle 
5.5.6.1. Level of purpose specified 
5.5.6.1.1. Very High:  
5.5.6.1.2. High:  
5.5.6.1.3. Medium:  
5.5.6.1.4. Low:  
5.5.6.1.5. None / Not Stated:  
5.5.6.2. Purpose legitimate 
5.5.6.2.1. Yes:  
5.5.6.2.2. No:  
5.5.6.3. Retention period  
5.5.6.3.1. None:  
5.5.6.3.2. As long as needed to fulfill contract:  
5.5.6.3.3. Specified period - anonymized:  
5.5.6.3.4. Specified period - not anonymized:  
5.5.6.3.5. Forever - anonymized:  
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5.5.6.3.6. Forever - not anonymized:  
5.5.7. Processing by a third party - data sharing 
5.5.7.1. Instructed by controller 
5.5.7.1.1. Yes:  
5.5.7.1.2. No:  
5.5.7.2. Level of compliance with obligations of controller 
5.5.7.2.1. Very High:  
5.5.7.2.2. High:  
5.5.7.2.3. Medium:  
5.5.7.2.4. Low:  
5.5.7.2.5. None / Not Stated:  
5.5.7.3. Legal binding contract in place 
5.5.7.3.1. Yes:  
5.5.7.3.2. Partly:  
5.5.7.3.3. No / Unknown:  
5.5.8. Accountability 
5.5.8.1. Person nominated to watch over compliance 
5.5.8.1.1. Yes:  
5.5.8.1.2. No / not stated:  
5.5.9. Openness 
5.5.9.1. Policies about procedures available 
5.5.9.1.1. Yes - refer to location:  
5.5.9.1.2. No / Not stated:  
5.5.10. Anonymity 
5.5.10.1. Data anonymized 
5.5.10.1.1. Yes, fully:  
5.5.10.1.2. Yes, pseudo-anonymized:  
5.5.10.1.3. No / Unknown:  
5.5.11. Consent 
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5.5.11.1. Explicit 
5.5.11.1.1. Standing:  
5.5.11.1.2. Other:  
5.5.11.1.3. No:  
5.5.11.2. Implicit 
5.5.11.2.1. National Security:  
5.5.11.2.2. Legal Obligation:  
5.5.11.2.3. Protection of Vital Interests of Data Subject: 
 
5.5.12. Transfer between different jurisdictions 
5.5.12.1. If transfer - justification to transfer data to jurisdiction with 
different privacy protection laws 
5.5.12.1.1. unambiguous consent by data subject - refer to 
consent:  
5.5.12.1.2. necessary for fulfillment of contract - refer to 
contract:  
5.5.12.1.3. legal requirement - refer to law:  
5.5.12.1.4. None:  
5.5.12.1.5. Not stated:  
5.5.12.2. Privacy Protection Laws Standards 
5.5.12.2.1. Very High:  
5.5.12.2.2. High:  
5.5.12.2.3. Medium:  
5.5.12.2.4. Low:  
5.5.12.2.5. None / Not Stated:  
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5.6. Relationship between concepts and principles 
 
So far, we have discussed different concepts and relationships in the 
generic privacy ontology as well as the privacy principles, which are also 
called quality aspects in the context of privacy for our purposes. In this 
section, we explain how the various privacy concepts of the generic privacy 
ontology map to these privacy principles. Every concept in the generic 
privacy ontology has an association with one of the quality aspects (i.e. the 
privacy principles) to state that it influences it in some way. We understand 
that this is a very fuzzy terminology, but the actual influence will be 
decided by the privacy ontology commitment as determined by the 
application domain expert. For example, every resource and its dependent 
purpose influences the principle or quality aspect of data quality. However, 
as the actual type of resource or purpose is not determined by the generic 
privacy ontology, we can only say that it influences that quality aspect 
(data quality) in some way. Therefore, data quality is a function of resource 
and purpose. When it comes to ontology commitment, a domain expert 
would specify multiple types of resources and purposes and therefore have 
to specify the data quality aspect as well. The domain expert has to follow 
the structure of that particular quality aspect and determine appropriate 
values for the various quality assessment criteria. In our example, we 
assume that our domain expert creates a privacy ontology commitment for 
the medical domain and classifies "patient information" as a particular 
resource within the resource tree and purpose "ProvideMedicalAttention" 
within the purpose hierarchy. One of the quality assessment criteria of data 
quality is "Data Adequacy". The domain expert would classify this with 5 
stars from our range of possible ordinal values between 1 and 5, where 5 is 
the highest. We therefore conclude that the data provided here is 
adequate to a high level, which contributes to our evaluation of the level of 
privacy received in section 5.7.  
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A second example to describe our approach is the very generic concept of 
"Entity". Entity itself does not have any influence by itself, although, one of 
its associations does. Entity has an association named "isInJurisdiction" 
with the concept of "Territory". Territory in turn has an association with 
privacy principle or quality aspect 5.5.12 (transfer between different 
jurisdictions). The domain expert would then have to determine the 
specific commitment. In our example, we assume the application domain is 
e-commerce and the domain expert needs to model certain business 
processes. With regards to the territory and its mapping to the quality 
aspect, the domain expert would have to assign values to the various 
territories in which customers and clients may reside, in context of the 
application domain. For example, if the instance "Europe" were one of the 
territories, a value of "5 stars" might be assigned and a value of "3 stars" to 
"United States of America". During the privacy evaluation process, the level 
of privacy would be determined according to the values assigned and 
remain the same, for example, if both entities were in the same territory. 
They would drop if the data subject were in a 5-star territory while the 
other entity were in a 3-star one, but would remain the same if the data 
subject were in a 3-star one and the other entity in a 5-star one. This is true 
as the communication channels and laws of both territories apply and 
therefore we have to use the minimum of both.  
 
5.7. Privacy evaluation process 
 
So far, we have discussed the various concepts, relationships, privacy 
principles and how they are associated with each other. This section 
describes the privacy evaluation process, which is the process that 
determines the level of privacy experienced when dealing with or 
performing certain transactions or dealing with certain systems. 
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In the previous section, we described how generic ontology concepts map 
to various privacy principles and how a domain expert for a particular 
application domain would assign ordinal values. We have decided to use 
ordinal values as privacy is an endogenous conception and not 
mathematically precise. In addition to the various levels of privacy as 
determined by the domain expert at class level or during run-time, 
preferences can be taken into account. Every quality aspect has a default 
weight assigned to it, depending on the application domain. This can be 
used by the user to tailor the level of privacy experienced to his/her own 
needs. For example, a user might not care that his or her personal 
information are taken offshore to a different country with weaker privacy 
protection laws. The weight of this quality aspect would then be reduced 
accordingly to reduce the impact factor of the overall evaluation. Hence, 
we use the following formula to define the level of privacy Lp: 
 
 
 
where n is the number of quality aspects assessed, w the weight or impact 
of a particular privacy principle and Qi the privacy evaluation of the 
particular principle. The weight w is defined as: 0≤w≤1, where 0 is defined 
as having no impact or no importance on that particular quality aspect and 
1 having full impact. Max is an ordinal value, which we have defined as 
number 5, which is equivalent to the highest value a quality aspect can be 
assessed at. The rounding function Round rounds the value up or down to 
the next ordinal value. We assign the same number of stars to the outcome 
evaluation that this number dictates. The formula for Qi is defined as: 
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where m the number of quality assessment criteria for Qi is and A the value 
that has been determined by the application domain expert for a particular 
assessment criteria and is an ordinal value that ranges between 1 and max, 
which is defined as number 5 in this thesis. It is important to say that we 
expect the weight values to be fairly static across any given application 
domain as this is determined by a domain expert once and should apply to 
a large number of individuals within that domain. Nevertheless, individuals 
may change the weight for a particular domain to tailor it to their own 
needs. For example, we have determined the impact factor of the 
safeguard privacy principle as 0.5 as safeguards cannot be perfect in that 
domain due to the vital protection of the interests of the data subject, 
which means that it needs to be possible to access medical details in an 
emergency which is possible if safeguards are not too strong, but as they 
are less important in this domain, the level of privacy does not deteriorate 
to an inappropriately high level. 
 
Our evaluation of the level of privacy experienced can be done on a 
concept by concept or process by process basis, where each is assessed 
individually. However, if many concepts and processes are involved, we 
state that the minimum of the individual assessments for each privacy 
principle applies. For example, if we have evaluated privacy principle 
"Safeguards" three times within a certain system or transaction and the 
outcome varies each time (which is likely), then we would use the lowest of 
those assessments to determine the overall value. 
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5.8. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we described the conceptualization of the generic privacy 
ontology, its concepts and relationships as well as the privacy principles. 
Furthermore, we elaborated the level of privacy for particular concepts 
relating to the privacy principles and how the level of privacy is assessed 
when performing certain transactions.  
 
The generic privacy ontology is composed of virtual classes that have only a 
few attributes which remain abstract. More concreteness can be added by 
a domain expert who can extend the generic privacy ontology to a 
particular application domain and, at that level, attributes become more 
concrete. This is in contrast to the instance level of a particular application 
domain privacy ontology, where the concepts represent particular 
individuals. The concrete class is therefore specified as a collection of 
instances. 
 
In the next two chapters, we provide an application domain extension of 
this generic privacy ontology to more concrete classes and thus attributes 
for two different domains. This will also allow us to show the actual impact 
values for various concepts which in turn allow us to determine the level of 
privacy experienced. 
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6. Specialization I - Restricted medical domain 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we extend our discussion beyond the generic privacy 
ontology and describe its application to a restricted medical domain. As the 
medical domain is vast and has countless concepts related to a variety of 
issues that have no privacy implications, we have to limit ourselves to 
keeping the example concise and ensuring that only privacy-related 
concepts are included. We have selected a hospital situation and will first 
provide the concepts, relationships and processes for that domain. We 
have chosen a real world scenario as an example to show that the ontology 
can be applied to both real and digital world scenarios, thereby 
emphasizing its abstraction from any application domain as done in some 
of our previous work [69]. This is followed by the extension of the generic 
privacy ontology with concepts from the medical domain to create the 
medical privacy ontology. We then describe the example and how the level 
of privacy is influenced, computed and evaluated and then conclude this 
chapter. 
 
6.2. Medical Domain Ontology 
 
Since this thesis focuses on the issue of privacy, we will describe an 
application domain ontology from the medical domain that is a very small 
subset of concepts from the total medical domain that are actually related 
to the issue of privacy. A domain expert would proceed similarly as only 
those concepts that are going to be used are actually part of an ontology, in 
order to reduce complexity. The most commonly used ontology in the 
medical domain is the Unified Medical Language System (UMLS). However, 
for our elaboration and in order to avoid confusion, we will present our 
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own restricted application domain ontology for health. This is important as 
the majority of concepts in UMLS or the medical domain in general are not 
applicable to the context of privacy. For example, the medical domain has a 
very large number of concepts that deal with different illnesses, their 
treatments and causes as well as drug uses and drug composition, which 
are of no interest to use as they do not contribute to our elaboration. In 
general, we are not limited to creating ontologies from scratch, but can 
integrate and use other ontologies with a reasonable amount of effort by a 
domain expert, who would choose appropriate concepts from the ontology 
and create a sub-ontology of the main one [68]. 
 
We present the domain ontology in an explanatory fashion to make it 
easier to understand the concepts and follow the example. Furthermore, 
we do not claim this to be a complete or concise ontology for this 
application domain. 
 
In the medical domain as in most other application domains, the concepts 
of resources and entities are the most important and the most common. 
 
6.2.1. Concepts 
 
The most important concept in our clinical example is "Person", which we 
define as a natural person who is not deceased. A person would also have 
certain demographic details, namely first name, last name, date of birth, 
residential address, phone number. We would also have next of kin, which 
is an association to a different "Person". As this is not specific to the 
medical domain, we could reuse this concept from an ontology of the 
demographic domain if existent. We then specialize the concept of person 
with the concept of "Patient", which we define as a person, who is under 
medical care or treatment due to a medical issue. A different type of 
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person would be the concept of "StaffMember". A staff member can be 
specialized much further, but we have limited ourselves to the concepts of 
"MedicalStaffMember", "ClericalStaffMember" and "GeneralStaffMember" 
for the sake of clarity here. Medical staff can be broken down into "Doctor" 
and "Nurse", but may have other concepts that we have also omitted here 
as they do not play any role in our elaboration. Another important concept 
is "MedicalProvider" which employs a number of staff and which we will 
use here as the entity that takes care of patients. Both conceptualizations 
are depicted in Figure 23 and Figure 24. 
firstName
lastName
dateOfBirth
residentialAddress
phoneNumber
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«extends»
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hasR
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Figure 23: Medical Ontology subset 1 
 
A patient record is a collection of personal information with different levels 
of sensitivity and access privileges. It has to be categorized appropriately to 
allow sufficient access and privacy protection. We assume that a patient 
record can contain demographic information, information about chronic 
conditions such as allergies, previous diagnosed medical conditions, 
previous medical care received as well as information about medications or 
current treatments.  
97 
 
 
 
Patient
StaffMember
MedicalStaffMember ClericalStaffMember GeneralStaffMember
«extends»«extends» «extends»
Nurse Doctor
«extends» «extends»
Interpreter
«extends»
 
Figure 24: Medical Ontology - staff concepts 
 
6.2.2. Processes 
 
The previous section has explained various concepts in our restricted 
medical domain, which will now need to be enhanced with various 
processes that may occur in this domain. One of the processes would be 
"admission" (to a hospital). Admission refers to the process of admitting a 
person for particular reasons to a medical provider, who may or may not 
have a patient record about this person, whom we refer to as "Patient". 
During admission, additional personal information is collected in order, for 
example, to retrieve, amend or correct the patient health record as 
depicted in Figure 25. The actual process of retrieving the patient record 
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will not be described here, but would be part of a more extensive 
elaboration. 
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Figure 25: Admission process 
 
A second process is called "Translation", which can be understood in 
multiple ways. To our understanding, and use, translation refers to the 
process whereby a particular entity converts information from one format 
into another. For example, a translation could be from a real world paper 
document into its digital equivalent as well as the actual translation from 
one language into another. This may be needed in the medical domain if a 
patient is not sufficiently familiar with the language spoken. 
 
In addition to the processes mentioned above, the medical domain, among 
others, has processes that deal with personal information slightly 
differently. Personal information can be generated or obtained indirectly 
and therefore needs to be assessed differently. However, as they still deal 
with personal information, we still regard them as privacy processes. An 
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example of such a process is determining the blood group of a patient. A 
nurse takes a blood sample from a person and then sends it off to the 
laboratory to determine the blood group. We regard this as obtaining 
information indirectly, which affects certain privacy principles negatively, 
as errors might occur during this process and it may depend on the quality 
of the blood sample or the lab testing it. Another example would be a 
doctor assessing the psychological profile of a patient. This would highly 
depend on the doctor being able to make an accurate assessment which 
then impacts on the data quality (e.g. being accurate). 
 
6.3. Medical Privacy Ontology 
 
Next, we need to create the domain privacy ontology for our restricted 
medical ontology. Hence, we need to take it concept by concept from the 
application domain and create new concepts that commit to the 
appropriate concepts of the generic privacy ontology. Furthermore, the 
concepts must also take on the privacy relevant attributes of the 
application domain concept. 
 
Our first concept from the domain ontology is "Person", which we can see 
as a form of entity in the generic privacy ontology. Thus, we create a new 
concept "EntityPerson" that commits to all attributes and relationships of 
"Entity", namely the identifier and the relationship "jurisdiction", which 
associates the territory with the entity. Second, it takes on the attributes 
"firstName", "lastName", "dateOfBirth", "residentialAddress" and phone 
number as well as the relationship "nextOfKin" as depicted in Figure 26. 
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EntityPerson
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Figure 26: EntityPerson 
 
The second concept in our domain ontology is "Patient", which we classify 
as a "DataSubject" in the generic privacy ontology. The newly created 
concept in our domain privacy ontology is called "AliveDataSubject-Patient" 
and commits to all the different attributes and relationships of 
"AliveDataSubject". It also takes on the privacy relevant attributes of 
"Patient" as shown in  
Figure 27. 
 
Now, the various staff members need to be classified. Generally, they are 
all classified as entities as a specialization of the previously created concept 
EntityPerson. Although a hospital has a myriad of staff, we will not bother 
to classify all of them as it is not relevant to our purposes here. We assume 
that we have a particular clerical staff, which is mainly a receptionist as well 
as a doctor who takes care of the patient. In our generic privacy ontology, 
we classify "Receptionist" as a ResourceHandler, who is permitted to read 
and "handle" personal information. The concept of this representation is 
called "ResourceHandler_Receptionist". As discussed in the previous 
chapter, a resource handler can - from a privacy perspective - read and 
"translate" personal information. This includes the receptionist as he or she 
can take personal information and enter it into the hospital computer 
system, where we assume that the patient has filled out a paper-based 
form, which is taken by the receptionist to enter the details. Although the 
actual permissions on a computer system may require the receptionist to 
101 
 
alter personal information, this is not the case from our privacy ontology 
perspective, as he or she acts on behalf of the patient only.  
Territory jurisdiction firstName
lastName
dateOfBirth
residentialAddress
phoneNumber
EntityPerson
nextOfKin 
AliveDataSubject_Patient
«extends»
DataSubjectIdentityhasIdentity
  
Figure 27: AliveDataSubject_Patient 
 
The concept of Doctor can be classified further within the domain ontology, 
e.g. GP, Dermatologist or Dentist, but the general concept of doctor 
suffices for our needs. Normally, it is assumed that any medical doctor 
involved in a patient's care in a hospital has access to personal information 
of the patient unless a personal conflict exists, which could restrict access 
to certain details only. In our generic privacy ontology, a doctor is classified 
as ResourceModifier if in charge of a patient and we name the new concept 
ResourceModifier_Doctor in our restricted medical domain ontology.  
 
We consider the most important concept of our restricted medical domain 
to be the patient record, containing patient information, most of it of a 
sensitive nature. Naturally, the patient record refers to the concept of 
resource in our generic privacy ontology, with its individual resource 
elements. They in turn refer to the various entries on the patient record 
and need to be classified accordingly. For the sake of clarity, we assume 
that our patient record has three different types of entries, which are 
demographic information, medical history and psychological profile. In 
reality however, patient records will have many more entries in various 
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other categories, which are most likely cascaded and structured further. 
However, our limitation here is satisfactory for demonstration purposes 
without loss of generality. We assume that demographic information is 
categorized as "IdentifyingResourceElement" and the other two as 
PseudoAnonymousResourceElements as none has personal identifiers 
attached. However, this assessment can never be completely precise as 
one person may have some medical history that is unique across a certain 
area and therefore has the potential to be identified. Nevertheless, in order 
to identify or specifically name the person to whim this resource element 
refers, demographic details - from any source - are necessary. For example, 
if a patient in a hospital were the only one with a particular illness, others 
could still not identify him or her without additional information (e.g. name 
and room number).  
 
Finally, we need to classify the various processes in our application domain 
ontology. The processes that are relevant to our context of privacy are the 
ones that are involved with personal information in some way. Hence, any 
other processes within the application domain are not required to be 
modeled within the context of our privacy ontology extension. The process 
of admission is definitely one of them as it involves the collection of 
personal information from the data subject. Looking at the generic privacy 
ontology, we can see that a process that involves personal information is 
called a "PrivacyProcess" about certain resources, which are about a data 
subject that is performed by a certain EntityIdentity and governed by a 
certain policy. We can even specify this further as a 
"ShareResourceProcess" as it involves a resource authoriser, namely the 
data subject or specifically the patient in our case, and a recipient of 
personal information, which is a resource user or specifically the medical 
provider here. We call the new process concept 
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"Admission_ShareResourceProcess" in our restricted medical domain 
privacy ontology as shown in Figure 28.  
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Figure 28: Admission_ShareResourceProcess 
 
It is noteworthy that the resource authoriser does not need to be the same 
person as the data subject, such as in the case of minors, where parents 
provide the necessary information and therefore, are resource authoriser 
by law. 
 
Now that we have created and classified an example subset of the various 
concepts in our application domain privacy ontology, we add the mappings 
to the different quality aspects, namely the privacy principles, which will 
subsequently help us to evaluate the level of privacy. We decided to show 
the information ordered by privacy principles instead of concepts as this 
makes it easier to understand the various implications. Our first quality 
aspect, data quality, has a weight of "high" in this domain as medical data 
must be adequate and correct at all times. Otherwise, it could be fatal if 
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information such as details about allergies were incorrect or missing. As 
data quality is a function of resource and purpose, we have to consider 
both concepts together. This is the case during our privacy process 
"Admission_ShareResourceProcess". We assign a very high level to all three 
quality assessment criteria, as the details requested are highly adequate, 
relevant to the purpose of medical care, and correct as directly provided by 
the data subject and no other (third) party. Security as the second quality 
aspect is assigned a weight value of "medium". The reason behind this logic 
is the nature of this data and the protection of vital interests of the data 
subject. Therefore, security cannot play such an important role in the 
medical domain, as methods need to exist that allow employees of the 
medical provider to gain access to personal information in an emergency 
situation without explicit consent from the patient. However, due to this, 
the weight value can be adjusted by the data subject in question to tailor it 
to their own needs, as they may think that this principle is more important 
than for an average person. Although we have omitted to mention the 
actual safeguard concepts for our admission example, we apply a value of 3 
out of 5 for adequacy of safeguards and 5 out of 5 for adequacy of 
personnel requirements. The remaining five other quality assessment 
criteria for this aspect are not relevant for this process and therefore play 
no part in the evaluation of the level of privacy and have no impact 
whatsoever. The data subject's rights are determined by policies that 
govern privacy processes. Although we have not shown any policies 
previously as they comprise lengthy documents, we will show a couple of 
policy concepts for our elaboration. As described in the generic privacy 
ontology, a policy is a set of statements with certain relationships. In our 
example here, we assume that the hospital has a statement that permits 
data subjects to request access to their personal information in writing and 
patients can view and change it after having made an appointment. 
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Therefore, we classify the access privileges as "high" (4 out of 5) and the 
level of ability to request rectifications as "very high" (5 out of 5). 
Furthermore, the policy also states that the personal information can be 
withheld for certain purposes, e.g. can be blocked from certain staff 
members. This is also classified as "very high" for ability to block content 
for certain purposes. The policy does not state that it is possible to object 
against processing altogether, which is therefore classified as "not stated" 
(1 out of 5). We assign a weight level of "high" to this quality aspect as this 
domain contains highly sensitive information and blocking, objecting and 
rectifying of personal information or the processing thereof is highly 
relevant. The privacy principle of "Legitimate Grounds of Processing" is also 
influenced directly by each privacy process, thus, "Admission" in our 
example. The aspect of "Unambiguous consent" receives a "very high" 
value, as does the criteria "Protection of vital interests of data subject". The 
remaining criteria are ignored for this purpose as they are not relevant. 
This also applies to the sensitive category criteria, as the whole domain is 
subject to sensitive personal information, which includes medical data. 
Therefore, it is not valid to ask if personal details contain medical data as 
they are the important data in this domain. However, as personal 
information contain highly sensitive data, the weight is "high" for 
"Legitimate Grounds of Processing". The "Transparency" principle also 
receives a "high" weight value as it is deemed highly important in the 
context of privacy to be notified of personal medical information being 
collected and processed. Our admission example would map to a value of 
"before collection" (5 out of 5) for "Data obtained directly, notify of 
processing" as the patient knows that his data is being collected (as he or 
she provides it) and will be used for his or her own medical care. All other 
criteria receive a "very high" (5 out of 5) as well, as the identity of the 
medical provider is revealed, the purpose of the data is stated and then is 
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recorded in accordance with current laws, which are at a high level. This 
has been inferred by the territory in which the medical provider resides. As 
a third party is not involved, this received a "very high" (5 out of 5) as well. 
One of the other principles worth mentioning is "Anonymity". We assign a 
weight of "low" to it as anonymity during the admission process is 
essentially pointless. The quality assessment criteria of "data anonymized" 
is specified as "No" and therefore receives a value of 1 out of 5 - however, 
as the weight for this principle is low, the impact on the overall level is 
negligible, which makes common sense to have a qualitatively high set of 
personal information as it is usually vital in the medical domain, and in 
particular during admission, to know who is being admitted.  
 
Although we have not mentioned every single privacy principle, we have 
discussed the most important ones and described the impact of every 
principle. Furthermore, we have shown the various assessment criteria and 
the values that have been pre-assigned by a domain expert. 
 
6.4. Example of instances 
 
In the previous section, we elaborated the restricted medical privacy 
ontology on a class level and discussed the mappings to the various privacy 
principles on a conceptual level. In this section, we will describe an actual 
example, which can be seen as an instance of the application domain 
privacy ontology. Naturally, we select the process of admission for our 
small example as it has been previously discussed at length on a class level. 
 
In our small example, we assume that Lim Kun, a 22-year-old exchange 
student from China, has to go to his local private hospital in Townsville for 
a blood test as he is feeling unwell and his body is shaking. On his arrival, 
he has to fill out the form for his admission, and a new file is created as Lim 
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has never been to this hospital. The doctor in charge then orders a blood 
test to check for diabetes. This small example already describes two 
processes that involve personal information, one being the admission 
process and the other the process of extracting information about the 
patient's blood (e.g. type and other substances or the lack thereof in the 
blood). Now, we consider this example and show how the level of privacy is 
evaluated. 
 
When going into the hospital, Lim knows that he will be dealing with this 
medical provider (name: "Park Haven Private Hospital", abn: 
"31064632613") and the various laws and regulations governing it, which, 
for example, have implications for the privacy laws under which his 
information will be legally protected, influencing the privacy principle 
"Legitimate Grounds of Processing". On arrival, Lim is asked to produce his 
Medicare card, which he does not have, as he is an exchange student. 
Hence, he is asked to provide a different form of ID, whereby he chooses 
his Australian student ID. The student ID contains his full name ("Lim Kun"), 
the student number ("1432451"), the university at which he is enrolled 
("James Cook University"), an image depicting him, an expiry date 
("31/03/2010") and a holographic logo for security reasons. A student ID is 
classified as "IdentifyingIdentity" concept in the demographic domain 
identifying the student, which impacts on the anonymity privacy principle, 
inferring that the level of anonymity is low (1 out of 5 stars), but so is the 
importance of this principle as described in the previous chapter; and 
hence, this will not have a great impact on the overall level of privacy. As 
Lim is providing the ID himself, it affects the levels of Transparency and 
Data Quality, which are both set to "very high" from Lim's point of view - 
regardless of the actual content of the data. He is asked by the receptionist 
to fill out the admission form. She is a clerical staff member of the hospital, 
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whose name "Jane" is displayed on her name badge together with a logo of 
the hospital. In addition to the details on his student ID, he has to provide 
his residential address ("12 Derby Street, Mysterton"), his phone number 
("0416960612"), his date of birth ("12/03/1987"), his gender ("male") and 
his next of kin - which we will omit here. In addition to his basic 
demographic information, he has to provide any relevant medical history 
("nothing relevant") and any kind of medication he is currently taking 
("none") as well as any allergies ("none") to medications. Finally, he agrees 
to the policy of the document and gives his consent that the data provided 
can be used and stored for the current purpose and future visits. The paper 
form which is the medium for recording Lim's information has no direct 
safeguards. The only safeguard in place is his ability to fill out the form in a 
quiet, private are, which impacts upon the principle of security by assigning 
a "medium" safeguard to this activity. Afterwards, he hands over the form 
to Jane and she types everything into her computer without any further 
interaction between them apart from asking him to wait until called. The 
action of entering Lim's details into the hospital's computer system is a 
translation process as she converts from one format to another without 
altering the content semantically as best as possible. This process does not 
give the receptionist (who reflects the concept of "Staff_ResourceHandler") 
any further consent to use his details for any other purpose or to reveal it 
to anyone else, than Lim has consented to in the first place. Although Lim is 
not aware of any safeguards in place once the details have been entered, 
the laws and regulations of the territory provide adequate requirements to 
medical providers. The hospital computer system is designed to not store 
personal details with medical data. Every section of medical information 
gets an arbitrary identifier that can link it with personal details if required. 
Therefore, the individual pieces are pseudo-anonymized to an extent. After 
a while, doctor "John" (a Doctor_ResourceModifier) , who accesses the file 
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and sees the patient, requests a blood test as he believes Lim may have 
diabetes. The nurse in question takes a blood sample and affixes an ID that 
is linked in the computer system to the vial. The pathologist checks the 
blood sample and enters the details of glucose blood particles into the file 
for the ID in question. Although this piece of information is about our 
patient "Lim", it has not been obtained directly from him, but has been 
assessed by a third party, which could introduce errors and therefore 
impacts on the principle of Data Quality in terms of impacting on the 
criteria of correctness, setting it from "very high" to high (4 out of 5 stars). 
We will conclude our instance example here and continue in the next 
section evaluating the values that have been collected throughout and 
describe the level of privacy that is experienced. 
 
6.5. Evaluation 
 
We assume that Lim Kun is happy with the standard weight template of the 
restricted medical domain that has been defined by the domain expert 
with regards to the level of privacy for the various privacy principles. The 
weight level of every quality aspect is shown in the table below as we have 
determined for our example. 
 
Privacy principle / quality aspect Defined impact weight  
Data Quality high 
Security medium 
Data subject's rights high 
Legitimate Grounds of Processing high 
Transparency high 
Consent medium 
Anonymity low 
Finality principle medium 
Processing by a 3rd party high 
Table 1: Privacy principles weight 1 
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This weight table applies to the various processes and concepts across our 
restricted medical domain and all of our evaluations are based upon them. 
When calculating them, we convert the weight values to numbers, which 
are 0.1 for low, 0.5 for medium and 0.9 for high. 
 
The evaluation of the different steps is done in tabular form. Below, we 
describe the various steps and show the influences in table xyz. 
 
Step 1: Lim enters the hospital. This refers to the activity of consciously 
choosing a hospital due to a medical problem. This step introduces Lim to 
the medical domain, which applies the weight factors (w) as listed in Table 
1 that are used in the privacy level calculations. It also introduces to the 
concept of medical provider with a certain territory and all its legal 
implications.  
 
Step 2: This step comprises the admission process, where Lim has to 
provide his student ID, fill out the form and his details are entered into the 
hospital computer system. This introduces a number of concepts, which are 
his identity and his personal information as well as medical details, which 
are conceptualized as resource elements. Furthermore, the hospital policy 
is added. In the next part, the concept of receptionist as a staff member of 
the hospital is introduced who takes the details from the paper-based form 
and adds them to Lim's newly created personal medical record. 
 
Step 3: In this step, the concept of a medical doctor is introduced, who has 
access to Lim's personal information and can amend it as required. 
 
Step 4: In this final step of our example, additional details are added 
indirectly by means of a blood test, which is analyzed by a pathologist.  
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 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
Data Quality "n/a" 5 5 4.6 
Security "n/a" 4 "n/a" 4 
Data subject's rights "n/a" 3.75 "n/a" 3.75 
Legitimate Grounds of 
Processing 
"n/a" 5 5 5 
Transparency "n/a" 5 "n/a" 5 
Consent "n/a" 5 5 5 
Anonymity "n/a" 1 1 3 
Finality principle "n/a" 3.6 3.6 5 
Processing by a 3rd party "n/a" "n/a" "n/a" "n/a" 
Total: "n/a" 4.48 4.6 4.62 
Table 2: Quality aspects: assignments 
 
Finally, we have to calculate the overall level of privacy experienced for this 
example, using the formula as defined previously. The table above does not 
have a value for every cell as not all privacy principles are influenced by 
every step; these are marked by the term "n/a". As step 1 does not deal 
with personal information as such, but only sets up the environment by 
defining the context and hence the impact factors as shown in Table 1, no 
privacy evaluation is possible.  
 
As the lowest level of privacy emerged from step 2, we use this minimum 
as the overall level of privacy experienced in this example, which is 4.48 
and is therefore rounded down to 4, for which we assign 4 stars and refer 
to is as a level of "high". 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, we have provided an extension of the generic privacy 
 ontology for a restricted medical domain as the application domain. Firstly, 
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 we described the medical domain ontology that has then been used in 
conjunction with the generic privacy ontology to build the ontology 
commitment of the restricted medical domain privacy ontology. We have 
named various concepts, relationships and processes and assigned concrete 
attributes to them and how and with what impact level they map to the 
privacy principles. This was followed by an actual example, which provided 
the instances for our concepts, attributes and processes and concluded with 
an evaluation thereof, describing a weight impact table as well as the actual 
level of privacy reflected by that example. 
 
The example in this chapter was primarily focused on the user perspective. 
In the next chapter, we will provide a more provider-oriented example from 
the e-commerce domain that shows how the ontology helps e-commerce 
service providers to integrate privacy related concepts and mechanisms into 
their system and processes. 
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7. Specialization II - B2C E-Commerce domain 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, we described a user perceived example from a 
restricted medical domain. We have described the concepts of that 
application domain and their usage to create the application domain 
privacy ontology that commits to the generic privacy ontology and commits 
to a number of selected concepts from the domain ontology. We then 
described an instance example for a hospital scenario. The example was 
given from the user's perspective, based upon established concepts, 
processes and procedures within that domain. 
 
In this example, we focus on another application domain, by providing an 
e-business scenario for a new online shopping system that needs to deal 
with privacy related issues. The discussion is based upon our previous work 
which has been quite successful in this domain and published in an IEEE 
transaction [70]. Essentially, the ontology is used to add privacy concepts 
into the shopping system while it is being built to allow the engineers of 
that system to adhere to industry standards and legislation with regards to 
privacy. It allows the engineers to protect their customers' privacy by 
integrating relevant mechanisms into it. As engineers are not necessarily 
experts in the context of privacy, they use this ontology to gain a greater 
understanding of its concepts and dimensions as well as their influences on 
the overall level of privacy the customers experience. This is beneficial for 
both customers and service providers as both can be confident that 
personal information is protected appropriately and financial and image 
loss is less likely to occur from loss of personal information. 
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The example will show a restricted e-commerce domain as it is not possible 
or useful within the scope of this thesis, to show the myriads of concepts 
that are available in this domain. The primary focus is therefore on the 
concepts and processes of an e-commerce business-to-customer (B2C) 
website, like Amazon. A further limitation applies that we will concentrate 
on the customers' expected perspective and will not go into details about 
ordering products from distributors and so on. We will make the 
assumption that we always have enough products in stock to meet 
customers' demand. Generally, we will base our discussion upon the work 
of Chan et al. [71].  
 
7.2. Restricted B2C E-Commerce Domain Ontology 
 
7.2.1. Basic high level concepts 
 
On an abstract level, every B2C e-commerce system, just like a normal 
business in the real world, will have to deal with the concepts of "Goods", 
"Customer", "Merchant", "Order", "Payment" and "DeliveryMethod" as 
discussed in [71]. The main difference between a B2C e-commerce website 
and a real world business is the availability of a shop-front, which is not 
necessary in e-commerce. As goods are on display and orders can be made 
online, it reaches a greater potential customer audience by far. 
Furthermore, the online retailer can provide a search engine and has the 
ability to personalize the website experience based upon the consumer, 
which is not available in traditional B2C systems.  
 
The basic concepts and relationships among them are described in Figure 
29. Businesses are, by definition meant to sell goods, which can be tangible 
or intangible. Customers usually desire goods and place an order for them. 
Afterwards, they have to make a payment for the order and receive the 
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tangible goods. We have decided to distinguish here, as intangible goods 
cannot be received by definition, but we leave the specification open and 
define this relationship as "use". This means that an intangible good, also 
known as service can be used in some way after it has been paid for.  
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Figure 29: B2C part overview 
 
The structure of "Goods" is shown in Figure 30. Goods as the upper or top 
concept can be specialized further into tangible and intangible goods, 
where intangible goods are commonly referred to as "Services". Tangible 
products need to be specialized further into physical and digital goods, as 
this has certain implications for their storage, distribution and delivery. 
Finally, physical goods need to be categorized as perishable ones and non-
perishable ones, as they have different restrictions for their storage and 
delivery times that need to be taken into account when modeling (e.g. has 
attributes that define expiration date and storage requirements such as 
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temperature) and physically stocking them. However, as we are no 
interested in the actual products as they contain very little or no privacy-
related data, we will not provide any further details or categories for 
different goods. 
 
Goods
Tangible Intangible
Physical Digital
Perishable Nonperishable
 
Figure 30: Goods hierarchy 
 
In our highly abstract perspective, we also have to distinguish between 
concepts and processes as well that may be mistaken for each other as 
they may be commonly referred to by the same name. For example, an 
"order" could refer to the actual process of ordering something or to the 
order record or details. Thus, we have decided to not use the term "order" 
and "delivery" in instances where it may be unclear. Instead, we refer to 
the "OrderDetails" as the static concept of the actual order record 
containing all the details of the purchase. The actual process of ordering 
goods is then referred to as "OrderProcess" with its inherent attributes and 
relationships. The same applies to "delivery", where we define the static 
concept "DeliveryMethod" and the process of delivering is named 
"DeliveryProcess" and elaborated further down the track in this section. 
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In general, a merchant is either an individual or an organization who trades 
as a business under a certain business name as shown in Figure 31. This 
becomes important as it influences the place of jurisdiction, for example, 
and makes it possible for merchants to trade as multiple businesses.  
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Figure 31: Merchant trading as Business 
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Figure 32: Order and Delivery 
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The order that is placed (as in OrderDetails) by the customer contains 
certain attributes and relationships. It has a relationship with the various 
goods that have been ordered and with a relationship to a delivery 
method. Without loss of generality, we assume that only one delivery 
method can be chosen for each order and that each order is composed of 
either intangible or tangible goods and may be either physical or digital 
goods. The actual delivery then has to be performed by a certain category 
of delivery agent, depending on the type of goods, which can be a real 
world postal agent or software distribution service provider.  
 
7.2.2. Technical level concepts 
 
In the previous section, we described the various concepts on a business 
level that is more abstract than a technical level. As our privacy 
considerations are closely related to the technical concepts, processes and 
policies, we will now provide the technical level on a conceptual basis. This 
means that we will provide concepts like shopping cart, but will not delve 
into their actual technical implementation (e.g. we will not specify details 
of the kind of software or hardware used or required to implement the 
technical concepts) as our approach is implementation level independent.  
 
Naturally, we have to model the same or similar concepts as in the 
discussion above. In the digital world, we assume that individuals - our 
customers - are represented by a certain account they choose to create. 
This account includes certain details like a username, password, email 
address, first and last name as well as residential and delivery address(es) 
as shown in Figure 33. In addition, it could also include financial data, such 
as credit card or bank account details. However, best practice demands 
that this financial information not to be stored with the user account, but 
that it be used and requested every time a purchase is made. The other 
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option would be to store financial details separately from the user details 
and link them to the user account. This could be done in such a way that 
different access policies and mechanisms apply to financial details than to 
normal user information. In our model, the user account is the concept that 
is used throughout the various processes, but it is still the customer who is 
actually behind this user account and who decides upon the instances of 
the user account attributes, desires the products and makes the actual 
purchases and receives the goods. 
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Figure 33: Customer and UserAccount 
 
The next concept required in our technical presentation is the actual order 
(not the process), which is similar to the one in our higher level discussion. 
For example, an order can contain an order number, a timestamp showing 
when the order was placed and a total value as well as a boolean value that 
the order has been paid for. Normally, our details are stored in a database 
and when conceptualizing our approach, we can keep this in mind to make 
the transition to a database easier. Therefore, we decided to refer the 
order back to the user account and not vice versa as in our previous higher 
level abstraction depicted in Figure 34. The order also has an association 
with the payment method. Generally, payments can be made via a third 
party payment processor, or directly. The difference between them is that 
the former approach does not reveal financial details to the service 
provider. Furthermore, it may increase a customer's level of trust, as he can 
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use a certified financial provider (e.g. Paypal) that he may have been used 
previously and that offers a certain level of protection.  
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Figure 34: Order concept 
 
As we want to show privacy implications here, both options are provided 
and the outcome of the chosen method will impact on the privacy quality 
aspects. Without loss of generality, we limit ourselves to payments that 
have to be made prior to the delivery of the goods, which includes cash on 
delivery (COD) as purchase orders and tax invoices are often not offered to 
end customers (in a B2C conceptualization) and have other implications 
that are beyond the scope of this work. 
 
PaymentMethod
OfflinePaymentOnlinePayment
DirectDeposit CashOnDeliveryDirect ViaProcessor
DirectDebit CreditCard DirectDebit CreditCard
 
Figure 35: PaymentMethod 
 
Payments can be classified as online and offline payments, which have 
implications for certain privacy dimensions as discussed below. Offline 
payments refer to payments made in way other than via the merchant's 
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website. This can include online payments (e.g. direct deposit) via the 
website of the customer's bank. However, as this is beyond the scope of 
the merchant, it cannot be explored any further here. Online payments, on 
the other hand, are made directly after the order has been placed, either 
by entering financial details on the merchant's website, who processes 
them directly, or via a payment processor. The methods available to the 
customer are determined by the payment processor and therefore - again - 
are beyond the scope of the merchant and hence, our discussion. However, 
the merchant does receive a confirmation from the payment processor 
that a payment has been processed successfully, allowing the merchant to 
proceed with the order process. Direct payments made via the merchant's 
website can include credit cards and direct deposit payments where 
customers have to enter their credit card details or bank account details. 
The merchant has the option to save those details for subsequent orders, 
which, however, influences some privacy dimensions, depending on the 
storage facilities available.  
 
7.2.3. Technical level processes 
 
After discussing the main concepts in the context of privacy, we elaborate 
the various processes and workflows that use personal details from the 
initial contact with the customer to the finalization of an order. 
 
The initial contact with a customer is the visit of the e-commerce website. 
Customers usually do not need to register in order to visit an e-commerce 
website and browse the goods advertised. Customer visits to a website 
reveal a small portion of semi-personal information that includes IP 
addresses, which can imply other details about the customer's country and 
internet service provider if not obfuscated in some way by the customer, 
which, however, is not known to the other party. It also contains details 
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about previous visits (in the form of cookies, for example) or web browser 
information. The information revealed does not necessarily identify a single 
person, but a computer in many cases that may be used by multiple 
persons at the same time. However, for our elaboration we will not pursue 
this avenue any further within the scope of this thesis. 
 
The initial process is the registration of the customer where he creates a 
user account that contains details as described above. The account is 
assigned an automatic user account number and the user has to choose a 
username and a password. The length and complexity of the password 
protects the user account accordingly. The other details are all user-chosen 
and are not verified by the merchant in general; however, some require a 
verification of the customer's email address. By registering, customers also 
agree to the terms and conditions of the website / business and may be 
asked if their details can be used for promotional purposes like email 
advertisements from the business or its partners. From the time of 
registration, subsequent website visits can be tracked to particular user 
accounts, and hence, to the associated real world customer if the account 
information is valid. 
 
The second process is the process of ordering goods from the business, 
which involves the selection of the actual goods and their quantity. During 
the checkout process, the customer will be asked to provide additional 
personal information if this is different from the one's registered. This may 
include different shipping addresses for example. The checkout process is 
usually completed by a selection of the payment and delivery methods as 
well as the user agreeing to certain additional terms and conditions. We 
have opted to show details of the payment in a separate process, although 
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this may be integrated into the actual ordering process. The order is usually 
acknowledged by an email to the customer's email address. 
 
The third process is about payment for the goods ordered. The customer 
has a choice of direct payments or payments via a processor as discussed 
above and has to provide financial details as required, which may be 
verified immediately (e.g. credit card details) or require a certain amount of 
time to process (e.g. direct debits).  
 
The fourth and final process is dedicated to the delivery of goods. We omit 
the concepts of waiting for stock to arrive in the warehouse and assume, 
for the purpose of our discussion, that stock is available at all times. 
Depending on the type of goods, delivery may be instant (e.g. a download) 
or may have to be passed on to a delivery agency. We assume that pick-ups 
are not possible in our example. As downloads are a simple process, a real 
world delivery involves additional parties with which certain personal 
information needs to be shared, such as name and delivery address.  
 
7.3. E-Commerce Privacy Ontology 
 
After we have described the various concepts, attributes, relationships and 
processes in this application domain, we continue by creating the restricted 
B2C e-commerce privacy ontology. This ontology is created by using the 
concepts from the application domain ontology and the relevant generic 
privacy ontology concepts in order to create the new application domain 
privacy ontology concepts and relationships. 
 
The first two of our concepts are the customer and their user account. We 
have identified them as the concept of "Customer_DataSubject" and 
"UserAccount_Identity" respectively. We name the user account identity as 
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a customer can have multiple at any given time and can very freely decide 
on the instances of the concept attributes. As identities are merely 
resources as depicted in Figure 16, identities require safeguards to protect 
the concept from unauthorized access. We assume that the identity 
identifies the user as he or she is likely to be wanting to receive the 
ordered goods as shown in Figure 36. However, the impact of false 
information is marginal for the business until the customer actually places 
an order. The only information that can be ascertained is that the customer 
must have had access to the email address, as it had to be verified before 
activation.  
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Figure 36: Customer_DataSubject and one of its identities 
 
Secondly, we model the concept of business from the application domain. 
The newly created concept is named "Business_ResourceReader", as the 
business is an entity that can access (but not modify) personal information 
and hence can be classified as "ResourceReader" as shown in Figure 37. 
One of the resources to which the business will have access to is the user 
identity.  
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Figure 37: BusinessResourceReader 
 
The third important concept is the terms and conditions of the website and 
its usage. Essentially, it is a policy with various statements that describe 
how personal information is stored, used and accessed. An example of 
these statements is shown in Figure 38 and more specifically in Figure 39. 
However, the actual selection of policies can only be determined at 
instance level as it is us to the merchant or business to determine the 
content, which can be selected from available statements in the application 
domain privacy ontology. 
Policy StatementhasOneOrMore
Purpose
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Figure 38: Policies and statements 
 
Figure 39 shows an example of building blocks for our e-commerce 
description. Essentially, the system developers will need to select 
appropriate classes for purposes, recipients, retention and resource in 
order to assemble the statement. Instance-wise, they need to add the 
attribute instance for these concepts, but for clarity, we have omitted the 
attributes in this figure. For example, one could decide to build a statement 
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that is about the credit card details of the user and has as its purpose the  
"PaymentPurpose". Furthermore, it may have a recipient concept of 
"Merchant" and a retention of "Forever". When choosing these blocks, it is 
immediately clear how the quality aspects are influenced as the mapping is 
provided (see below). For instance, the concept of retention influences the 
privacy principle of "Finality Principle" in the generic privacy ontology and 
choosing a retention time of one year provides a concrete mapping to the 
quality aspect of "retention period", to which the domain expert has 
assigned a level of "Specified period - not anonymized", which evaluates to 
3 out of 5 stars and, hence, has a negative impact on the overall level of 
privacy. Therefore, by selecting the retention concept of "ForPurpose", this 
would change this impact level from 3 stars to 5 out of 5 stars, thereby 
improving upon the overall level of privacy. 
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Figure 39: Policy statement template in the e-commerce domain 
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Before we continue with the actual instances of our example, we need to 
define the weight level in this domain that is applied to the quality aspects 
of our evaluation. We cannot simply take the weight factors from our 
example in the previous chapter and re-use it here, as the requirements 
and type of data concepts have changed. For example, instead of medical 
data, we have to deal with financial information that requires different 
privacy preservation principles. 
 
Privacy principle / quality aspect Defined impact weight  
Data Quality medium 
Security high 
Data subject's rights medium 
Legitimate Grounds of Processing high 
Transparency high 
Consent high 
Anonymity medium 
Finality principle high 
Processing by a 3rd party high 
Table 3: Weight / impact values in the e-commerce domain 
 
In our restricted B2C e-commerce domain, we have selected the weight 
values as follows: "Data quality" that deals with correctness and adequacy 
of information, is set to a "medium" impact factor, as incorrect 
information, for example, will have no real damaging fact as it would in the 
medical domain. This is easy to understand as incorrect medical details may 
have life-threatening consequences, while this does not apply to either 
demographic or financial details, remembering that this is from the 
perspective of the customer. "Security", as the second quality aspect, has a 
"high" impact factor as it is necessary to protect financial information with 
a high adequacy level of safeguards as unauthorized access to financial 
details can produce financial losses for the customer. "Data subject's 
rights", as the third quality aspect, has a "medium" impact factor in this 
domain as there is no immediate requirement to amend or alter personal 
details and the consequences of delayed updates and access are 
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comparatively lower. "Legitimate Grounds of Processing", as the fourth 
impact factor, has a "high" impact, as the entity (the business) processing 
personal information must have legal grounds for processing personal 
information (i.e. it must be a business) and unambiguous consent from the 
data subject to process it. Any activity contrary to that could potentially 
have a significant impact on customer-experienced privacy. 
"Transparency", as the fifth quality aspect, has a "high" impact factor 
weight, as it is essential for the customer to be notified about any 
collection of personal information and also about who has access to what 
personal information and for what purpose, especially when dealing with 
financial information. "Consent", as the sixth quality aspect, has a "high" 
impact, as it is vital for the data subject that the processing party uses 
personal information for the agreed purpose only, as failure to do so could 
lead to personal details being revealed to others, which is not desirable in 
this domain. "Anonymity", as the seventh quality aspect, has a "medium" 
impact factor since anonymity is not possible when ordering goods online 
and having them delivered. However, personal details should be 
anonymized when they are not used for the actual purchase of the order 
but for other organizational tasks. The "Finality principle", as the "eighth" 
quality aspect, has an impact factor of "high" as personal information, 
especially financial details, should be used only for the purchasing purpose 
and not be kept for any other reason. "Processing by a third party", as the 
ninths quality aspect, has a weight impact factor of "high", as personal 
information should not be revealed to other parties unless necessary for 
the fulfillment of the contract, for example delivery (i.e. the postal agency 
will need the name and address for delivery). However, other personal 
details, in particular financial information, should not be shared with other 
third parties that may not even be known to the data subject, without 
unambiguous consent. This is often the case in this domain, as personal 
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information (e.g. what kinds of products is a certain customer interested in) 
are sold for telemarketing purposes, for example. 
 
After we have defined the impact factor of the various privacy principles, it 
is necessary to define which concept and process impacts upon which 
principle. However, we are discussing this in the next section since our 
instance example will have to select various concepts and their associated 
implications in order to assess the level of privacy that is best for the 
customer. Therefore, we want to show the various options available and 
choose to do this on an instance level. 
 
7.4. Example of instances 
 
In our instance example, we assume the position of developers of an e-
commerce B2C system that is being designed and built and has the goal of 
setting up an online presence for customer interaction and purchase (i.e. a 
shopping website). The primacy goal of our approach is the integration of 
privacy related concepts and principles to design it from the ground up 
with customer privacy in mind.  
 
7.4.1. Concepts 
 
Selecting the types of information that are required to register and order a 
product is essential in order to determine whether they are not excessive. 
The developers can select various resource element concepts that form 
part of the identity, which in turn reflects the concept of UserAccount. The 
attributes chosen for the UserAccount have been shown in the previous 
section and are a customer number (e.g. "123456"), a username (e.g. 
"johnsmith"), the password, which is a highly sensitive resource and 
therefore should be protected by the concept NonTransitSafeguard called 
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"MD5Hash" (which hashes the password according to the MD5 algorithm 
and then only the hash is stored, but never the plain-text password) to 
achieve a higher level of privacy as described below, the first name ("e.g. 
"John"), the last name (e.g. "Smith"), the email-address (e.g. 
"johnsmith@email.com"), the customer's phone number (e.g. 
"+61456789012"), the residential address (e.g. "1 George Street, Sydney, 
NSW 2000") as well as a delivery address (e.g. "1 George Street, Sydney, 
NSW 2000"). The selection of appropriate passwords by the customer also 
impacts upon the level of privacy, since weak passwords are prone to 
brute-force or dictionary attacks. However, the actual strength of a 
password is not evaluated with the concept of a user account, but during 
the process of registration or the process of password change, where 
certain policies can be applied that enforce complex and lengthy passwords 
which in turn impacts on the relevant quality aspect of "Security". Hence, 
the password itself is a safeguard ("access control") as well as being 
protected by a safeguard (a non transit safeguard). The "DataQuality" 
quality aspect that assesses the adequacy, relevance and correctness of a 
resource (i.e. personal information), has an assigned value of "very high", 
as all the information as mentioned above is relevant to the process of 
ordering a product. Furthermore, the data subject (i.e. customer) provides 
the actual information and, hence, they it can be deemed to be correct. In 
general, no party other than the customer would alter personal account 
details here, making the data subject the sole "ResourceModifier" for 
personal account details (which implies the actual very high level on 
correctness of data quality). However, the customer can advise, hence 
authorize the business to make alterations on his behalf, for example in the 
case where accessing the data is not possible. This would not alter this 
assessment and hence the quality aspect. Security as another privacy 
principle is directly impacted upon by the quality of protection in terms of 
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storage for the whole repository of personal information. We have already 
mentioned the safeguard for the password, which is stored in its hashed 
form, not in plain-text. This impacts the quality aspect of security at a level 
of "very high" for the assessment criteria of adequacy, while a plain-text 
password would score a level of "low" here. Therefore, it is in the interests 
of the designers to choose the hashing safeguard for the password instead 
of storing it in plain-text. The second type of safeguard applies to the 
storage of personal details in whatever repository it is going to be stored 
(e.g. database). As this type of personal information is classified as 
demographic details, it has lower requirements in terms of storage 
safeguards. Therefore, selecting the safeguard concept of "NoSafeguard" is 
adequate in this context with the exception of the password, which we 
discussed previously. The third safeguard refers to the access control of 
personal information, which also requires an adequate safeguard. The 
safeguard could be "NoSafeguard", meaning that anybody who has access 
to the system can access those details. The concept of access safeguard 
however, is not related to the purpose of the data as this is a different issue 
described below. We have selected the access safeguard of 
"EmployedSalesAndSupportStaff" who are permitted to access these 
details, which is deemed as a "high" safeguard in terms of adequacy. This 
safeguard would prevent other users (e.g. other customers) from accessing 
personal information. As the password has an additional safeguard 
associated with it, it would not be revealed by this safeguard in its plain-
text form, but still in its encrypted form, which bears a relatively low risk. A 
subset of these user account details is created when the product is a 
physical, tangible good that requires shipping. In that case, the name, 
delivery address and phone number are extracted and shared with the 
delivery agency, which is a process that is explained below. 
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The second concept that deals with personal information is the concept of 
"Order", depending on how it is modeled in the system. We assume that 
the concept of order is composed of an order number that is generated 
automatically (e.g. "10001"), a timestamp that defines when the order was 
placed (e.g. "01/01/2009-15:31:12"), a boolean flag defining if the order 
has been paid for and the total value of the order (e.g. "$AU 277.31"). 
Furthermore, the order has a relationship with both the customer who has 
ordered it and with the payment method. This type of concept has no real 
personal information associated with it apart from the identifier that links 
it to the user account concept, which makes this a 
"PseudoAnonymousResourceElement". Therefore, we apply the same 
safeguards as before, having the same impact on the "Security" quality 
aspect. 
 
The third concept dealing with personal data is referred to as 
"PaymentDetails" and belongs to a highly sensitive category as it contains 
financial details. We assume that both credit card details and bank account 
details for direct debit have the same level of volatility and therefore need 
to be protected in the same way. "PaymentDetails" can either be a direct 
or an indirect concept as discussed in the previous sections, as it can be 
done via a third party service provider (the payment processor) or directly. 
The indirect one would contain attributes such as order number (e.g. 
"10001") as well as a reference number assigned by the payment processor 
(e.g. "123456789") that would appear on the bank transaction statement 
of the merchant. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all financial are 
transactions carried directly, not via a payment processor. Therefore, all 
financial details have to be collected from the customer directly. We show 
how a credit card resource would be used and protected and leave the 
direct debit example aside as it would work out similarly.  
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A "CreditCardPaymentDetails" concept would have attributes such as the 
credit card number, an expiry date, the name of the cardholder and the 
verification number as well as the type (e.g. "Mastercard" or "VISA"). This 
resource requires both a "NonTransitSafeguard" as well as an 
"AccessControlSafeguard" of a greater protection level than the one for 
demographic details. If we were to apply the same one as previously, the 
impact level of the assessment criteria "adequacy" for the "Security" 
quality aspect would decline dramatically. Therefore, we have chosen the 
access control safeguard of "ProcurementStaff", which allows persons 
directly involved with the processing of the order to access these details 
only. Furthermore, we have chosen the safeguard of "AESEncryption" for 
all details when stored permanently, which may be the case as processing 
the payment may not be instant due to multiple factors such as 
unavailability of the internal payment facility. The password for this 
encryption would be known by members of procurement staff only, or be 
integrated into their authorization system. We can apply similar rules to 
the quality of the password as we did earlier with the customer password 
in order to achieve a higher level of privacy preservation through security 
mechanisms. 
 
7.4.2. Processes 
 
We have already explained the various processes in this system, mainly the 
"UserRegistration", "OrderProcess", "PaymentProcess" and 
"DeliveryProcess". As all of them are involved in dealing with personal 
information, they are to be classified as "PrivacyProcess" that has certain 
attributes and relationships. The main relationship here is the association 
with a safeguard as every "PrivacyProcess" needs to be safeguarded 
adequately. The "UserRegistration" process involves the user entering his 
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details online and agreeing to the policies and terms. The safeguard in 
place would be a "TransitSafeguard" that protects the information end-to-
end between the physical entering and the storage. The most common 
"TransitSafeguard" used nowadays is "TransportLayerSecurity" (TLS) a 
successor of Socket Layer Security (SSL), which creates an encrypted and 
authenticated tunnel between the user and the e-commerce system / 
website (or whatever interface it is). The attributes and details of that 
safeguard are beyond the scope of this thesis and can be found in the 
relevant documents (e.g. RFC 2246). This safeguard is best practice and 
commonly used and therefore assigned a "very high" level of adequacy for 
"Security". During registration, the user would have to choose a password, 
which is bound by certain policies that determine the complexity needs. In 
general, e-commerce websites have to balance between their users' need 
for strong passwords and their business needs since they may lose 
customers if the requirements are too high and the user decides not to 
register, thereby perhaps losing the user's custom if he proceeded with an 
order. Therefore, in our policy statement that defines the password 
complexity, we choose a moderate one such as 
"MinimumEightCharacters", which has a medium level of adequacy for 
security and hence lowers the overall level, but this is acceptable due to 
the potential loss of custom if very strong ones were enforced.  
 
The policies and terms of services are a vital part of the user registration 
and build the contract between the customer and the business when the 
customer agrees to them - even more when ordering actual goods. We 
have shown building blocks and excerpts from the policy design in the 
previous section and need to decide on some of the statements as an 
example of how such a policy would be assembled and its impact on the 
level of privacy. As a policy is composed of a variety of statements, we have 
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to limit ourselves to a very small example in our discussion here. For our 
example, we use the statement about the financial details. We choose to 
use the purpose "PaymentPurpose", the recipient concept of "Merchant" 
and a retention of "ForPurpose". This assigns the best possible values for 
"Transparency", "DataQuality" and "FinalityPrinciple". If we had chosen a 
retention of "Forever", the finality principle would have suffered and lower 
values assigned. We would continue with all other statements in this 
fashion. 
 
The process of placing an order and entering payment details is similar and 
has similar safeguards as before. However, the impact of a weak safeguard 
for financial details is much higher than for demographic details.  
 
The final process in our elaboration is the one that refers to sharing of 
personal entities. This can include contractors as well as other partners 
who may have a commercial interest in those details (e.g. marketing / 
advertising companies). As we assume that our customer privacy is of the 
uttermost importance, we assume that sharing of personal details is 
permitted only if unambiguous consent is provided or it is required in order 
to fulfill the contract with the customer (e.g. for delivery).  
 
We do not discuss the technical implementation of our approach, although 
this would impact on the levels of privacy. For example, if we had chosen 
an implementation that had security problems or programming errors and 
therefore could lead to exposure of personal information, this would assign 
lower levels for the relevant quality aspect on an implementational level 
evaluation.  
 
7.5. Evaluation of the abstract technical level 
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 C1 C2 P1 P2 
Data Quality 5 5 5 5 
Security 4.5 5 5 5 
Data subject's rights 5 5 "n/a" "n/a" 
Legitimate Grounds of 
Processing 
5 5 5 5 
Transparency 5 5 5 5 
Consent 5 5 5 5 
Anonymity 1 3 3 3 
Finality principle 5 5 "n/a" "n/a" 
Processing by a 3rd party 5 5 5 5 
Total: 4.11 4.29 4.82 4.82 
Table 4: Evaluation of the B2C privacy ontology example 
  
 In this evaluation, we aggregate the concepts of "UserAccount" and "Order" 
 as they are similar with regards to their privacy requirements and refer to 
them as "C1" here. The payment details are referred to as "C2". The process 
of registration, which includes the policy, is referred to as "P1" and the 
process of ordering as "P2". This should suffice in our example here to 
provide an understanding of the evaluation of the overall level of privacy 
achieved as we have explained it at length in the previous sections.  
 
Data quality has very high levels (5 out of 5) for all of its assessment criteria 
(adequacy, relevance and correctness) and therefore, it equates to 5 
according to the formula in section 5.7. In our example, security is assessed 
by the adequacy of its safeguards and its security policies in place, which 
equates to 4.5 due to the fact that the lowest adequacy for the safeguard is 
4 (the one for the password has a medium impact level (3 out of 5)). The 
data subject's rights, which are assessed by the access privileges to one's 
own data, the level of ability to request changes and the ability to object 
against processing, is set to very high (5 out of 5) as well. The remaining 
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quality aspects all have very high levels, apart from the anonymity one as it 
is not possible in this domain to order goods and staying anonymous at the 
same time. However, as the weight factor of anonymity is medium only, its 
impact is reduced for the overall level. The order process as such is pseudo-
anonymous, as the order is stored under the customer number and that 
requires additional access. Combining the two resources of "UserAccount" 
and "OrderDetails" lowers the level of anonymity back to "no" (1 out of 5 
stars) however. As we evaluate by using the minimum level on the various 
evaluation steps, we can assume that a medium level for the "OrderDetails" 
and "no" for the "UserAccount" suffices. 
 
Overall, the level of privacy is evaluated as 4.11 (the minimum of all total 
values), as shown in Table 4, which equates to a level of 4 stars out of 5 
stars and is therefore deemed "high". This is mainly due to the lack of 
anonymity, which is, however, difficult to achieve. 
 
7.6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have provided an example from a restricted B2C e-
commerce domain, whereas developers designing a system need to build it 
in the context of privacy. Firstly, an application domain ontology was 
created, followed by the ontology commitment that commits to the 
generic privacy ontology as well as to some of the concepts, attributes and 
relationships of the application domain ontology. This has then been 
evaluated to achieve a high level of privacy for the customer experience. 
This has shown us that the ontology can aid system and application 
developers to gain a greater understanding of privacy and assist with their 
choice of concepts and methodology. 
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8. Implementation 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we will discuss the choice of language and the tools we 
have used to create the ontology according to the methodologies we have 
chosen. Therefore, we discuss RDFS and OWL as languages for the semantic 
web and elaborate our choices. This is followed by the explanation of our 
main development tool, Protégé, and we will show some of the concepts 
and relationships in the form of screenshots with accompanying 
explanations.  
 
8.2. Choice of languages 
 
8.2.1. RDF and RDFS 
 
The Resource Description Framework (RDF) is a language for 
representing information about resources on the World Wide Web 
[72]. It is used to make statements such as subject-predicate-object 
from the English language available in a machine readable format. 
Therefore, it is one of the choices for our requirements here. RDF has 
no vocabulary as such and anything can be expressed in it, as long as it 
follows the principles above. However, as the lack of vocabulary makes 
it unsuitable for machine processing, as any software would not 
understand the context or its meaning whatsoever, RDF Schema 
(RDFS) has been created. RDFS describes a way to define vocabularies 
that can be used by RDF. With the help of such a vocabulary, which has 
to be known by all parties using these statements, a principle way of 
exchanging information and making meaningful statements is possible. 
RDFS introduces the concept of classes, which allows classes to be 
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specialized into subclasses that can inherit from multiple upper classes. 
RDF, on the other hand, is then used to create and use instances of 
these classes and make the actual statements. On top of the class 
hierarchy, RDFS introduces certain other types. One of the types is 
"range", which describes that a certain subject instance has a valid 
range of objects from an instance of certain classes. Other properties 
of RDFS Include the ability to specify cardinality constraints on 
properties, such as a child having exactly one mother, or specifying 
synonyms, such as different classes with different names are actually 
the same concept. Furthermore, it is possible to create unions and 
intersections of classes and hence, create new classes thereof. 
However, ontologies require a far greater vocabulary as well as formal 
semantics, which is why RDF and RDFS are not sufficient for our needs 
to create an ontology. However, RDF and RDFS are reused on OWL, 
which is our language of choice to represent our ontology. 
 
8.2.2. OWL 
 
OWL is the web ontology language, a recommendation by the World 
Wide Web consortium [73]. It has been derived from the previous 
approaches of DAML [74] and OIL [75] and its successor DAML+OIL 
[76]. OWL is based upon RDF, but unlike RDF and RDFS, has a far 
greater expressiveness, as it specifies more than just relationships 
between resources and a generalization hierarchy respectively and 
also specifies formal semantics that are required for an ontology 
language. OWL comes in different "flavours", which are OWL Lite, OWL 
DL and OWL Full. The main difference between the three is their 
increasing expressiveness from simple constraints via computational 
completeness to syntactic freedom of RDF with no computational 
guarantees [73]. Hence, OWL-Full is an extension of OWL-DL and OWL-
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DL an extension of OWL-Lite, or an OWL Lite ontology is also a legal 
OWL-DL Ontology and every legal OWL-DL Ontology is also a legal OWL 
Full ontology. 
 
OWL-Lite is used in situations where the features of RDFS (a 
classification hierarchy) are required in conjunction with simple 
constraints [77]. As OWL-Lite has the lowest formal complexity (e.g. 
allows cardinalities of 0 and 1 only), it allows an easier migration path 
from simple hierarchies such as taxonomies. Furthermore, providing 
support tools for OWL-Lite is simpler than for the remaining two 
flavours of OWL due its low complexity. However, OWL-Lite is too 
limited for our requirements since we require cardinalities other than 
just 0 and 1. 
 
OWL-DL as an extension of OWL-Lite has greater semantic 
expressiveness, while retain computational guarantees. This means 
that it has the properties of computational completeness and a 
guarantees to compute in finite time, which also refers to it as being 
deterministic. The DL part of OWL-DL stands for Description Logic, 
which is a field of study concerned with the idea of automatic 
reasoning. Automatic reasoning is one of the requirements for our 
ontology and therefore, we decided to choose OWL-DL. OWL Full is not 
suitable for our requirements, although it provides greater semantic 
expressiveness, it lacks computation guarantees and therefore is not 
appropriate for our needs, as we need to be certain that our 
ontologies are computable in finite time in order to be useful in their 
application. We omit further descriptions of OWL, as countless 
examples and elaborations can be found in other works such as [73]. 
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8.3. Tools 
 
8.3.1. Protégé 
 
We decided to use Protégé, a tool for developing ontologies and 
knowledge-base frameworks from the University of Stanford, as our 
primary means to represent our conceptual ontology in machine-
readable format. It has an easy learning curve, while providing great 
user support and the ability to export into languages such as RDF, 
RDFS, XML schema and OWL, our choice of implementation language. 
 
For our purposes of representing our conceptual framework on an 
implementational level, Protégé is ideal due to its rapid prototyping 
features. Furthermore, we have chosen version 4 of Protégé, 
specifically Protégé-OWL due to its built-in reasoner and support for 
OWL2.0 features.  
 
8.4. Examples (screenshots and code snippets) 
 
8.4.1. Main concepts 
 
In this section, we will demonstrate some of the main concepts of our 
ontology, depicted as screenshots and code snippets from Protégé. We 
use the built-in OWL Viz plugin, which is based upon Graphviz version 
2.2. However, this plugin provides a class level view only and does not 
provide views for relationships (object properties) and data properties. 
Therefore, code snippets for data and object properties are provided 
as well. We have opted to show the inferred representations only as 
this provides a greater level of detail and relationships in some cases. It 
can also be seen as a formal validation method to check for 
inconsistencies in the ontology implementation; however, its intended 
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use is the inference of the class hierarchy, which shows up errors in 
cases where a relationship, expression or restriction cannot be 
satisfied and therefore is invalid. Our main concept hierarchy is the 
entity hierarchy as depicted in Figure 40. 
 
 
Figure 40: Entity concepts 
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Figure 41: Identities hierarchy 
  
 
Figure 42: Example: Identities usage 
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Our next area of concepts is the hierarchy of identities as depicted in 
Figure 41 and Figure 42. It shows the kinds of identities we have 
defined and their usage in the form of pseudo code snippets followed 
by the object property (relationship) "identifies", which states that a 
particular resource element can identify a particular type of identity as 
depicted in Figure 43. 
 
 
Figure 43: "identifies" object property 
 
A further main concept is that of "Resource", which has a number of 
"ResourceElements" with varying identification characteristics. 
ResourceElements are not specified as subclasses of Resource, as they 
do not have their own safeguards. A resource is protected by a 
safeguard and consists of one or more resource elements as shown in 
Figure 44 and Figure 45. 
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Figure 44: ResourceElements hierarchy 
 
 
Figure 45: Resource usage 
 
Finally, we show the concept of policy for this section of main generic 
privacy concepts. A policy is a resource and applies to a resource. 
Therefore, it is also protected by a safeguard. A policy is composed of a 
number of statements, which are about a resource, have a recipient, a 
purpose and a retention as shown in Figure 46 in the form of pseudo 
code.  
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Figure 46: Statement concept 
 
8.4.2. Privacy process 
 
The notion of privacy process has been described in previous chapters 
and defines an abstract concept of PrivacyProcess with a number of 
object datatypes (relationships) that define the resources about which 
this privacy process is all about, a policy that governs this process, an 
entity that performs this process and a safeguard that protects this 
process. In general, a "TransitSafeguard" would be applied to privacy 
processes; however, we cannot exclude the possibility of processes 
that require other types of safeguards in future extensions and hence, 
keep it more general as shown in Figure 47. 
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Figure 47: Privacy Process 
 
8.4.3. Privacy principles 
 
We have defined a number of privacy principles, which are also known 
as quality aspects and shown in Figure 48. They are used to determine 
the overall level of privacy one experiences. Every quality aspect has a 
number of different quality assessment criteria to evaluate the level of 
privacy for this particular principle. 
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Figure 48: Privacy principles / quality aspects 
 
For every privacy principle, we have a pool of classes that represent 
the quality assessment criteria. An example of these is shown in Figure 
49, which depicts the SecurityCriteria that contain the different 
assessment criteria for the SecurityPrivacyPrinciple.  
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Figure 49: SecurityCriteria concepts 
 
In order to provide a facility that allows the assignment of concepts 
from our range of quality assessment criteria levels (see next section), 
we have chosen to use an associate class as this would involve either a 
triangle relationship or would require OWL to allow for properties of 
properties, which is not permitted. Hence, we have created an 
associate class named "QualityAssessmentCriteriaAssignment", which 
has three object and one datatype property as shown in Figure 50.  
 
Figure 50: Associate class 
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The first object property is "hasPrivacyConcept", which states that this 
associate class is linked to some concept (including processes) from 
the "GenericPrivacyConcepts" domain. The second object property is 
named "hasAssessmentCriteriaValue", which links it to the domain of 
concepts named "QualityAssessmentCriteria", which in turn are the 
concepts that provide the quality assessment criteria for the quality 
aspects. The third and final object property is named "hasValue", 
which links it to the domain of concepts named 
"QualityAssessmentCriteriaLevelRange", which is the partition of 
concepts that defines the possible assertions for any given quality 
assessment criteria. The datatype property is a string, which defines an 
English term defining the actual meaning our assignment. For example, 
it could have a meaning of "Medium" or any other arbitrary string, if 
the concept of "MediumLevel" is assigned to the quality assessment 
criteria "RelevanceToPurpose", subclass of the "DataQualityCriteria" 
concept.  
 
 
8.4.4. Quality assessment criteria values 
 
Our privacy evaluation as described in previous chapters is based upon 
two different evaluation principles. Firstly, we have the domain 
specific weight, which specifies the "importance" of a certain quality 
aspect in the domain. This is modeled as a value partition and can have 
three members, High, Medium and Low, which are mutually disjoint as 
shown in Figure 51.  
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Figure 51: Weight partition 
 
As described, OWL Viz does not allow us to show the datatype 
properties that we have assigned to our value partition. Therefore, we 
show them as a screenshot of the data property usage windows, which 
is shown in Figure 52 and shows that our concepts of Low, Medium 
and High have assigned values of 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9 respectively. 
 
Figure 52: "hasWeightValue" datatype property 
 
The second part of the privacy evaluation process to determine the 
level of privacy involves ascertaining the impact that concepts and 
their relationships and attributes, as well as processes, have on various 
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quality assessment criteria of the quality aspects. This is modeled by a 
value partition as well and is shown in Figure 53, which has a number 
of members that are mostly mutually exclusive. We also provide some 
synonyms as some of the concepts are regarded as equal if they have 
the same value instances. The datatype properties of this value 
partition are described in Figure 54. It is noteworthy, that synonyms do 
not appear in that picture, as their usage is inferred automatically, due 
to the equivalence relationship with other concepts. The values 
assigned to these assessment criteria are ordinal numbers and range 
from one to five. 
 
Figure 53: Quality Assessment Criteria Value Partition 
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Figure 54: hasStars datatype property 
 
 
8.5. Conclusion 
 
In this section, we have provided screenshots from our modeling tool 
Protégé as well as pseudo code snippets in the form of class or property 
usages, which are provided by Protégé. Our class hierarchy has been 
organized as shown in Figure 55, which shows the various sub-domains of 
our conceptualization. This includes the associate class as mentioned 
above, the quality assessment criteria and their assessed privacy principles 
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as well as the generic privacy concepts that include the various concepts of 
the generic privacy ontology. Finally, it contains the value partitions that 
are used to evaluate ordinal and fuzzy values to our assessment criteria. 
 
 
Figure 55: Class hierarchy 
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9. Summary of thesis 
 
9.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, we will give a 
recapitulation of the work carried out in the thesis. We will carefully 
examine our research questions posed in Chapter 3 while doing this and 
discuss how the work contributes to addressing them. This is then followed 
by a discussion of future work that flows from this thesis.  
 
9.2. Recapitulation 
 
In Chapter 1, we introduced the general notion of privacy and discussed 
how it differs significantly from the concept of security, although privacy has 
been mistaken for security for too long. We then gave a broad overview of 
the field and described how privacy differs from individual to individual and 
from domain to domain. This was continued with a brief elaboration of the 
problems encountered in the area of privacy and we showed some 
examples of breaches where personal information got "lost" or was sold or 
shared without the consent of the subjects affected. This was supported by 
examining the financial impact that a breach of privacy has for the affected 
company or individual. Next, we provided a motivational and 
examplanatory discussion of the domain of e-commerce and noted how 
privacy and the potential loss of privacy can be inhibiting factor for its 
growth. Here, we identified some of the key motivations which include the 
simple and easy access to entering information in large and distributed 
databases and repositories, while losing most of the control once the 
information entered. 
 
This was followed by a discussion of the issues of privacy by design, which 
means that privacy enhancing technologies should not be added on top of 
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existing systems, but should be built into the design directly, which the 
literature has discussed for more than a decade. This, however, would 
require system developers to be experts in that domain as current tools and 
systems cannot provide appropriate assistance in this matter. Finally, we 
defined the scope of the problem, which was not to create new or better 
privacy enhancing technologies such as better encryption tools or other 
security mechanisms. We defined our scope in a much broader way in that 
we had to consider all levels and incorporate numerous concepts from 
different areas in order to provide a better understanding of privacy and a 
better way to enhance the user experience in the domain of privacy without 
limiting ourselves to a particular application domain. 
 
In Chapter 2, we discussed the background of privacy and its evolution over 
time, starting with the first official mention of privacy in the domain of law 
and justice in the late nineteen hundreds. Our discussion revealed different 
definitions of privacy, depending on the context of its usage. This was 
followed by the different notions of privacy, which provide different 
meanings and ways in which privacy can be approached and addressed. We 
continued with a discussion of the ways in which legislation influences our 
privacy experience and support and how it varies across different countries 
and regions. This can also be conflicting due to regional, state and federal 
laws and regulations. Our background focus then narrowed to privacy issues 
and challenges on the web, which include the inherent open, non-
deterministic nature of the web as well as current trends and techniques to 
support users and protect their privacy needs. This is mainly driven by P3P, 
the Platform for Privacy Preferences and its related preference exchange 
language (APPEL). Subsequently, we narrowed our focus even more and 
looked at the semantic web and the inherent problems and issues in the 
context of privacy, demonstrating how ontologies provide meaning to the 
157 
 
semantic web to allow for automatic reasoning. We concluded the chapter 
with a brief look at some of the current research trends in terms of privacy 
preserving data mining, which provides solutions such as k-Anonymity or l-
Diversity that are nevertheless limited to some extent. 
 
In Chapter 3, we stated the problem definition by providing our definitions 
of concepts that have been used throughout the thesis. They include our 
own definition and understanding of privacy as well as a discussion of the 
different notions of privacy, namely the right data, the right purpose and 
access control. Other definitions included trust and reputation and security 
and safeguards. This was followed by a definition of the main terms in 
privacy, namely data subject, entity, resource and process amongst others, 
and continued with an elaboration of the different dimensions of privacy, 
which we also refer to as privacy principles. They include data quality, 
anonymity, transparency, finality principle and security, to name a few. The 
problem definition followed and explained that privacy is not just a 
technical problem, but involves legal and jurisdictive dimensions. Hence, we 
state that we address the problem of capturing the knowledge in the field of 
privacy, with its concepts and relationships, which allows for semi-
automatic processing. This has led us to our research questions, which we 
re-iterate here:  
 
1) "How do we represent the various privacy concepts and relationships and 
the way they link up with each other?" 
2) "How can such a representation be used to increase the level of privacy 
preservation for the data subject?" 
3) "How can such a representation be used by system developers and 
service providers to achieve compliance with current rules and regulations 
as well as state of the art techniques to safeguard personal information?" 
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4) "How can this representation be used throughout various application 
domains and provide cross-domain privacy preservation experiences?" 
 
These research questions prompted us to consider the different levels and 
to determine privacy preservation requirements and the level of privacy 
experienced by individuals and its necessity to represent the knowledge in 
the domain within a conceptual framework. Before such a conceptualization 
could be commenced, it was necessary to discuss the methodology chosen 
to solve the problem. We looked at Natural Language Processing (NLP), 
which is unsuitable due to the difficulty of detecting the hidden knowledge 
in plain and unstructured text. We also looked at a mathematical 
representation, which was also deemed unsuitable due to the endogenous 
nature of privacy, which is uncertain and would require alterations every 
time new technologies or application domains emerge or evolved. We then 
concentrated on the study of knowledge representation and had the choice 
of a glossary of terms, which provides no taxonomies among the concepts 
or any kind of relation between the concepts, which is required for our 
purpose of capturing and inferring the knowledge in this domain. Topic 
Maps were another possible methodology and although promising, this was 
inadequate for our purpose, which was to define the allowable types in 
order to categorize and evaluate privacy preserving mechanisms. 
Eventually, we investigated the area of ontologies, which are defined as "a 
formal shared, explicit, but partial specification of the commonly agreed 
upon intended meaning of a conceptualisation", among many other 
definitions. This approach seemed appropriate for our requirements of 
representing knowledge in a particular domain and structuring it 
appropriately and hence, addressing our research question 1) with a 
satisfactory elucidation. In order to build an ontology however, a viable 
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methodology for its creation had to be found and the METHONTOLOGY 
approach was chosen for our work. 
 
In Chapter 4, we provided a brief solution overview by describing the 
various components involved, which can be seen as a guide to understand 
them and their interactions. We re-iterated the idea of an ontology to 
address our problems and depicted the real world by showing that the real 
world has numerous application domains, which all have a privacy 
component. Furthermore, privacy is its own domain that intersects with all 
application domains to some extent. Therefore, we concluded that it must 
be possible to model the application domain unspecific concepts and ideas 
into a separate concept domain. We started to model two different 
ontology concepts: firstly, a core ontology that represents the core concepts 
of the domain of privacy and secondly, specialized ontologies which 
represent commitments to the concepts of the generic privacy ontology but 
in addition describe specialized constraints, concepts and relationships 
pertinent to the application domain. 
 
Having developed the idea of such a generic and specialized ontology, it was 
necessary to find a means of measuring the level of privacy a user 
experiences. This need was addressed with the concepts of privacy 
principles which are quality aspects or dimensions to (measure) privacy. 
Hence, we concluded that the various concepts in our generic privacy 
ontology would determine the quality aspect that would be affected if that 
concept were to be used. However, at this stage, it would not be possible to 
determine the actual level of that influence as this is an application domain 
specific property. Therefore, application specific extensions of the generic 
privacy ontology were required. These extensions have to be created by an 
expert of the application domain, who uses concepts from that domain and 
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"re-attaches" them to the generic privacy ontology, creating an application 
domain privacy ontology that commits to all the concepts and requirements 
of the generic one and to a subset of the application domain ones, as only 
the ones that are pertinent to privacy need to be included. This kind of 
generic and application specific ontology makes it possible to provide 
support for privacy on inter-application domain specific levels as all the 
concepts, attributes and relationships of the application domain privacy 
ontology are inferred back to their counterparts of the generic privacy 
ontology. This essentially addresses our research question 4.  
 
Chapter 4 concluded with an elaboration of the main concepts of the 
generic privacy ontology, namely an entity, the data subject and a resource, 
which is a concept that represents personal information about a data 
subject.  
 
In Chapter 5, provided the concepts, properties and relationships of the 
generic privacy ontology at a far greater level of detail. We started with the 
hierarchy of entities, which is essentially a hierarchy defining different levels 
of access to resources about data subjects. These resources could also be 
categorized further into resources that have identifying characteristics and 
others that have pseudo identifying ones or none at all. However, as entities 
and hence, data subjects, might not want to be identified directly in every 
instance, identities were introduced that could represent the entity 
altogether, to an extent or not at all and it is the entity's choice to 
determine which identity to use. This includes the choice of remaining 
anonymous in certain transactions if necessary. It was also clear that 
resources need to be protected by safeguards, which can be classified into 
safeguards for transit or non-transit needs as well as access control 
safeguards. Furthermore, the ontology required support for policies, such as 
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privacy policies to support the data subjects with their decision making in 
terms of access control to their personal information. We have shown some 
of the common purposes such a privacy policy can have, adapting from P3P. 
In many cases, personal information is involved in processes, for example, 
when entering them into a system or when they are processed by an entity. 
This led to the need for the conceptual model of a privacy process, which is 
a process that is about personal information, governed by a policy, 
protected by a safeguard and performed by an entity. An example of such a 
privacy process is the shared resource process, which is a sub-concept of 
the privacy process and adds properties like recipient and sharedBy.  
 
This chapter continues with an elaboration of the representation of the 
privacy principles and their quality assessment criteria, which are used to 
determine the level of privacy for a particular transaction or process. As 
privacy is an endogenous concept, mathematically precise values were not 
appropriate and therefore, we chose to use ordinal values from a range of 
one to five, where one is the lowest and five the highest value, which is 
represented by one to five stars. We have determined the actual level 
assignments for each of the quality assessment criteria and assigned 
possible values to them, which are used to determine the level of privacy. 
After this elaboration, we have provided the formulas to determine the 
level of privacy in a given context. However, as the generic privacy ontology 
is less concrete, a calculation can be made only in the application domain 
specific extension. As our basic privacy concepts are the same across all 
application domains, but their needs for protection may be different, we 
introduced a weight factor, which is chosen initially by the domain expert to 
specify the impact factor of a particular privacy principle in an application 
domain specific extension. For example, unlike the financial domain, in the 
medical domain, safeguards are treated in a more circumscribed manner 
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and allow for exceptions, as access to personal information in a medical 
emergency must still be possible. Therefore, choosing a softer safeguard in 
the medical domain, but with a lower impact factor of the associated 
privacy principle, leads to a smaller output factor when determining the 
level of privacy. 
 
To make our idea more specific, we chose two different application domain 
examples, in Chapter 6 and 7, describing the medical and the e-commerce 
domains respectively. In both these example chapters, we begin by 
discussing the concepts of the respective application domains and describe 
examples of possible processes in that domain. However, due to the 
complexity and sheer size of any of these domains, we had to limit 
ourselves to restricted sub-domains of these application domains.  
 
In the example of the restricted medical domain given in Chapter 6, we 
discuss a possible hospital scenario. The prime concepts in such a scenario 
are medical provider, patient, staff and patient, record amongst others. Our 
example concept of "process" in this domain is an admission process where 
a patient is admitted to a medical provider for a particular reason. Upon this 
base, we modeled the medical privacy ontology by using the concept from 
our restricted medical domain and in conjunction with the concepts of the 
generic privacy ontology, creating a specialization of the latter. For example, 
a patient was classified as "AliveDataSubject_Patient" in our specialization. 
After describing the model of our application domain specific privacy 
ontology, we demonstrated some of the instances and hence, the various 
influences these concepts and instances have on the privacy principles. 
Additionally, we provided the weight factors of the medical domain in 
tabular form and used it together with our influence levels to determine the 
level of privacy for our hospital scenario. 
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Our approach in Chapter 7 was similar to the one in Chapter 6; however, we 
concentrated on the designer or developer perspective instead of the user 
perspective. The e-commerce domain example was used to incorporate 
privacy concepts into the design of a new e-commerce shopping system 
while it is being built in order to allow the engineers of that system to 
adhere to industry standards and legislation with regards to privacy. As 
engineers and system developers are not necessarily experts on the issue of 
privacy, they use this ontology to gain a greater understanding of its 
concepts and dimensions as well as their influences on the overall level of 
privacy that the customers experience. This is beneficial for both customers 
and service providers as both can be confident that personal information is 
protected appropriately and financial and image loss is less likely to occur 
from loss or misuse of personal information. 
 
After having described the various concepts, attributes and relationships of 
the application domain, a restricted B2C e-commerce one, we selected a 
few processes that the system had to be able to support. They included a 
user registration process, an order and payment, and a delivery process. We 
then created our application domain specific specialization of the generic 
privacy ontology, analogous to the approach used in Chapter 6. However, 
instead of simply evaluating the level of privacy for given concepts, we 
examined concepts that would support and enhance the level of privacy 
within our development. Therefore, we selected mainly those concepts that 
would highly and positively influence the quality assessment criteria and 
their related quality aspects. Eventually, a system emerged that included 
mainly concepts that would support and strengthen the level of privacy for 
the user and, hence, helped us to address research question 3).  
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In Chapter 8, we discussed our choice of language for our technical 
implementation. We discussed RDF and RDF schema as well as the different 
flavours of OWL, name Lite, DL and Full and noted that DL is the only viable 
option due to the limitations of Lite and the lack of computational 
guarantees for OWL-Full. In our elaboration, we showed many of the 
concepts and properties of our generic privacy ontology and the privacy 
principles as they have been implemented with the help of our 
implementation tool Protégé. 
 
9.3. Future Work 
 
9.3.1. Inclusion of Legal Frameworks 
 
Throughout this work, due to time limitations, we carefully 
circumscribed the problem to be addressed within the scope of this 
thesis. One issue that should be included in future work is the support 
for a legal framework. In order to fully understand the implications of a 
territory and its jurisdiction for the protection of user experienced 
privacy, it would be necessary to model them in a conceptual and 
semantic framework to allow for automatic reasoning within our 
domain. In general, it might be possible to model these on an 
ontological basis and integrate them within the generic privacy 
ontology. This kind of integration needs to be researched further, also 
with regards to other ontologies, such as those relating to trust and 
reputation. The integration or a mapping of these would greatly 
enhance the privacy effect and the overall experience that the data 
subject will encounter. Furthermore, more work needs to be done to 
develop a mapping to upper ontologies to provide more support for 
high level abstract terms and, hence, the integration with other 
systems.  
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9.3.2. Automating through an MDA architecture 
 
Although our work here to support developers and engineers of 
systems to gain a greater understanding of privacy and build the 
relevant principles into their systems was fruitful, it still contains many 
manual steps as described in Chapter 7. Our future research direction 
is a model-driven architecture, which is guided by the generic privacy 
ontology and its extensions to application domains, to automate those 
processes. We believe that it is possible to create a visual designer or 
editor that can be used to create programs and enrich them with 
privacy concepts on a fundamental level. This may be an extension or 
plugin to Eclipse, but as yet is unknown. 
 
9.3.3. Integration with Security Ontology 
 
In our discussion, we have mentioned the work of Schumacher [39], 
who proposed a security ontology to model the domain concepts of 
security. As elaborated, security and in particular, safeguards, are a 
vital component of privacy protection. Hence, the privacy ontology 
would benefit from an inclusion of such a security ontology to model 
safeguards and their associated properties effectively.  
 
9.3.4. Integration with Privacy Preserving Databases 
 
Our generic privacy ontology and its extensions to specific application 
domains could be used and integrated with privacy preserving 
databases in multiple ways. the ontology has concepts that represent 
privacy preserving databases, as these are one of the safeguards to 
preserving personal information. Different types of privacy preserving 
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databases are represented by their respective concepts and in turn 
linked to the different privacy principles to determine how well such a 
database can preserve privacy and therefore the privacy level 
experienced can be determined. Secondly, the ontology could be used 
by the database management system directly in order to determine 
the level of privacy desired for particular sets of information. This 
would require every piece of information or groups of information in 
the database to be linked to their ontology concept counterpart in 
order to classify the data and extract the rules and policies associated 
with it. This work of integrating the ontology into the database 
management system is beyond the scope of this thesis and hence, 
subject of future work.    
 
9.3.5. Monotonic Process Changes 
 
A useful theoretical element that can be added to the current work is 
characterizing monotonic process changes with regards to the level of 
privacy. It entails the issue of keeping the level of privacy at the same 
level while making changes to elements of processes that have been 
developed. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the various elements 
that will form part of the modified process. This will be addressed in 
future work as it is beyond the scope of this thesis and will be 
researched and investigated at much greater level of detail. 
 
9.3.6. Correlation of Privacy Rules with the Privacy Ontology 
 
In real world as well as digital world scenarios, privacy rules have been 
established that are normally composed of natural language, but may 
also be composed of languages such as P3P. In order for them to be 
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usable or re-usable within the privacy ontology, the rules would need 
to be conceptualized as concepts and relationships of the ontology 
itself and structured as statements in the policy part of the ontology. 
Once this is done, the rules have semantic value and can be used 
within the ontology to aide in privacy preservation. An implementation 
of such a conversion from rules to statement concepts is subject to 
future work as well as the relevant evaluation of this conversion with 
regards to the complexity, expressiveness and semantic clarity. 
 
9.4. Conclusion 
 
We conclude this thesis by briefly recapitulating our main goals and 
achievements. We have created a generic privacy ontology as well as 
extensions to it and the ability to extend the generic one to cater for other 
application domains. These can be used to determine the level of privacy for 
certain concepts, and processes within the application domain by the data 
subject, application designers or developers, or other entities that are 
involved with processing personal information in any given situation where 
the ontology is used. In future work, we will be demonstrating scenarios in a 
more comparative fashion to elaborate the value of the privacy ontology, 
describing how they would work out with and without support of the 
ontology. This will show even better the different levels of privacy 
experienced when using and sharing personal information.  
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